The European Alternative to Uniformity in Corporation Laws by Conard, Alfred F.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 89 Issue 8 
1991 
The European Alternative to Uniformity in Corporation Laws 
Alfred F. Conard 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, European Law Commons, and the Legislation 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Alfred F. Conard, The European Alternative to Uniformity in Corporation Laws, 89 MICH. L. REV. 2150 
(1991). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol89/iss8/4 
 
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan 
Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized 
editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
THE EUROPEAN ALTERNATIVE TO 
UNIFORMITY IN CORPORATION LAWS 
Alfred F. Conard* 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PREFACE .•.•••••.•..••••••...••••••••••••••••.•••••••••••••• 2151 
I. WHY COORDINATE? . . • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • 2152 
A. The Silence of the Founders ....................... 2152 
B. Balance and Stability ............................. 2155 
C. Gypsies at the Gate ............................... 2156 
D. ''Interests of Members" ........................... 2158 
E. The Interests of "Others" .......................... 2160 
F. National Interests . . . . . . . . .. .. . . . . . . . . .. .. .. .. .. .. . 2161 
II. THE INSTRUMENTS OF COORDINATION •••••••••••••••• 2162 
A. The Rejection of American Models ................. 2162 
B. The Directive ..................................... 2163 
C. The Community Corporation Act .................. 2164 
D. The Lawmakers .................................. 2166 
Ill. WHAT KINDS OF CORPORATIONS? ••••••••••••••••••••• 2167 
IV. THE CONTENT OF THE SAFEGUARDS • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 2169 
A. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2169 
B. Identification: Filing and Announcement ........... 2170 
C. Capital: Creation and Maintenance ................ 2172 
D. Financial Reporting ............................... 2175 
E. Mergers and Split-ups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2178 
F. One-Member Companies ........................... 2181 
G. Governance....................................... 2182 
1. The Fifth Directive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2182 
2. Independent Supervision ....................... 2183 
3. The Voice of Employees ....................... 2185 
* Henry M. Butzel Professor Emeritus, University of Michigan Law School; Distinguished 
Visiting Scholar, Stetson University College of Law. A.B. 1932, Grinnell College; LL.B. 1936, 
Pennsylvania; J.S.D. 1942, Columbia; LL.D. 1971, Grinnell College. - Ed. The author owes a 
particular debt to Professor Eric Stein, whose Harmonization of European Company Laws was a 
major source of information and concepts, and whose comments on this article were helpful, 
even if not fully reflected in the product. E. STEIN, HARMONIZATION OF EUROPEAN COMPANY 
LAWS (1971). In addition, the author acknowledges the helpful comments of Merritt Fox, Joel 
Seligman, and J.J. White, the invaluable research assistance of Martha Arthos, and the untiring 
production labors of Eeva Joensuu. 
2150 
August 1991] European Corporation Laws 2151 
4. The Loyalty of Managers and Supervisors ....... 2186 
5. The Powers of Shareholders .................... 2187 
H. Takeovers ........................................ 2187 
V. THE SUCCESS OF COORDINATION (FROM A EUROPEAN 
VIBWPOINT) ••••••••••••••••••••••••• : . • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • 2188 
A. A Market Economist's View ....................... 2188 
B. An Institutional Economist's View.................. 2189 
C. Gauges of Success. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2190 
1. Disclosing Identity and Finances ............... 2191 
2. Representation of Employees ................... 2191 
3. Independent Supervision of Management . . . . . . . 2192 
4. A ''Delaware of Europe"? ...................... 2193 
VI. LESSONS FOR AMERICANS ..••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 2194 
A. A Market Economist's Lesson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2194 
B. An Institutionalist's Lessons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2195 
1. Co"oboration ................................. 2195 
2. Would It Work Here? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2195 
a. An end to the race of laxity? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2196 
b. Standards of fiduciary duty and of fairness.. 2196 
c. The powers of shareholders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2197 
d. For whose benefit? ......................... 2198 
VII. SUMMARY • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 2200 
PREFACE 
Although the European Communities1 chose many patterns of 
business law that were parallel to the American, they deliberately re-
jected the American freedom of each state to frame its corporation law 
to suit itself. They decided to impose not complete uniformity, but a 
degree of "coordination" of "equivalent safeguards" that they deemed 
1. Although the expression "European Communities" ends with an "s," it refers to a singular 
governmental entity, as does the equally plural "United States." Unlike the United States today, 
the Communities are usually juxtaposed with a plural verb ("are," not "is") as were the United 
States before the Civil War. See 3 S. FOOTE, THE Clv!L WAR 1042 (1974). 
The plurality in the Communities' designation reflects the fact that before the merger of their 
institutions by the Single European Act of 1987, 30 O.J. EUR. CoMM. (No. L 169) 2 (1987) 
[hereinafter Single European Act], three separate European Communities - the Coal and Steel 
Community, the Economic Community, and the Atomic Energy Community - acted indepen-
dently of each other. The only one of these involved with corporation law was the Economic 
Community, which issued the directives and other proposals on the subject until July 1, 1987. 
Since that date, the united Communities have been the issuer. Although I will try to designate 
correctly the issuer of any particular order as the Community or the Communities, I will use the 
word "Community" as an attributive without distinction between the successive organizations. I 
will, for instance, refer to the "Community Council" and to "Community directives" to include 
the instruments of both the European Economic Community and the European Communities. 
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appropriate to the existence of an economic union.2 Leading commen-
tators have described the process as "harmonization. " 3 
The decision to coordinate stimulates reflection on the relative 
merits of the American system of giving states a free choice of corpo-
ration regimes, restricted only marginally by federal securities regula-
tion, and the European system of "minimum standards." The 
"safeguards" that leaders of other industrial societies have chosen as 
appropriate means of promoting prosperity in a market economy offer 
Americans a challenging example of such standards. 
I. WHY COORDINATE? 
A. The Silence of the Founders 
The Community founders, for whom the United States was a case 
study yielding both positive and negative lessons, were surely aware of 
the competition among American states to attract corporations, 4 in a 
2. The principal authority for enforcing conformity among company laws of the Communi-
ties' member states authorizes the Community organs to promote "freedom of establishment" 
within the Communities by, among other means -
coordinating to the necessary extent the safeguards which, for the protection of the interests 
of members and others, are required by Member States of companies or firms ••• with a 
view to making such safeguards equivalent throughout the Community •••• 
Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, art. 54(3)(g), reprinted 
in OFFICE FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS OP THE EUROPEAN CoMMUNITIES, TREATIES Esl'AB· 
USHING THE EUROPEAN CoMMUNITIES 225 (1973) [hereinafter Treaty]. This is the wording in 
the English text issued by the Communities Office for Official Publications in 1973, and is a 
translation of original texts in Dutch, French, German, and Italian. An earlier English text, 
issued by the Communities in 1962, used in place of"safeguards" the word "guarantees," which 
consequently appears in earlier discussions of the coordination program. See, e.g., E. STEIN, 
supra note•, at 36-41. "Guarantees" was presumably chosen in the earlier translation because 
of its resemblance to the garanties of the original French text. The corresponding word in the 
original German text was Schutzbestimmungen, which might be literally translated as "protec-
tion clauses." 
Although "safeguard" is not common coin of American corporate literature, Hurst wrote of 
measures to "safeguard creditors" as an apparent synonym for measures to "protect creditors." 
J. HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CoRPORATION IN THE LAW OP TIIE UNITED 
STATES 1780-1970, 52-53 (1970). Other authors have generally written of"protecting" creditors 
and investors. See L. Loss, FuNoAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 29 (1983); Douglas, 
Protecting the Investor, 23 YALE REv. 521 (1934). 
3. The literature on coordination of safeguards employs the caption "harmonization" in or-
der to embrace not only "coordination" of company laws under article 54(3)(g), of treatment of 
foreigners under article 56(2), of licenses for regulated trades under article 57(2) and (3), of 
exchange controls under article 70(1) of the Treaty, supra note 2, but also "approximation" 
under article 27 (customs) and miscellaneous laws under article 100(1); "harmonization" of taxes 
under article 99(1), of export subsidies under article 112(1), and of social policies under article 
117(1); and ''uniformity" in commercial policies under articles 111(1) and 113(1). See E. STEIN, 
supra note •, at 11-12. 
4. See Romano, The State Competition Debate in Corporation Law, in CoRPORATE LAW 
AND EcONOMIC ANALYSIS 216 (L. Bebchuk ed. 1990); R. WINTER, GOVERNMENT AND TIIE 
CoRPORATION (1978); Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corpora-
tion. 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977). On the evolution of U.S. state corporation laws from regula-
tory to permissive, see J. HURST, supra note 2, at 52-53. 
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rivalry characterized polemically as a "race for the bottom,''5 as a 
"climb to the top,''6 and more analytically as a "race of laxity."7 
Departing at the outset from the example of the U.S. Constitution, 
which made no mention of corporations, the constitution of the Euro-
pean Economic Community ("the Treaty"8) not only mentioned cor-
porations (as "companies"9) but expressly authorized the Community 
to establish what Americans might call "minimum standards."10 The 
Treaty called them "safeguards ... for the protection of the interests 
of members and others,'' and authorized the Community legislature to 
"coordinate" them "to the necessary extent ... with a view to making 
such safeguards equivalent throughout the Community."11 
By mid-1991, the Community had issued nine directives on com-
pany law, requiring "equivalent safeguards" in regard to incorpora-
tion, public filing, and financial reporting by domestic and foreign 
corporations, creation and maintenance of capital, domestic and inter-
state mergers, split-ups and split-offs, and accounting and auditing.12 
Other directives on governance (including the voice of labor), on 
5. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 705 
(1974). 
6. See FJSChel, The "Race to the Bottom" Revislted: Reflections on Recent Developments ln 
Delaware's Corporation Law, 16 Nw. U. L. REv. 913, 920 (1982). 
7. This was the term coined by Justice Brandeis in Liggett v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 559 (1933) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting). Although Brandeis condemned the race of laxity, the term itself seems 
more descriptive than polemic. Under Fischel's analysis, supra note 6, laxity is a virtue. 
8. Treaty, supra note 2. 
9. In British English, the variety used in the Treaty, incorporated business enterprises are 
co=only known as "companies." See, e.g., L. GoWER, PRINCIPLES OF MODERN CoMPANY 
LAW (4th ed. 1979); R. PENNINGTON, CoMPANY LAW (5th ed. 1985). 
10. See Seligman, The Cose for Federal Mlnimum Corporate Law Standards. 49 MD. L. REv. 
947 (1990); cf. Cary, supra note 5, at 696-703. 
11. Treaty, supra note 2, art. 54(3)(g). at 225. 
12. First Directive (on incorporation and registration), No. 68/151/EEC, 11 J.O. CoMM. 
EUR. (No. L 65) 8, 1 Cornman Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1] 1351 (1968); Second Directive (on capital), 
No. 77/91/EEC, 20 OJ. EUR. CoMM. 1 (No. L 26) 11, 1 Co=on Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1] 1355 
(1977); Third Directive (on mergers), No. 78/885/EEC of Oct. 9, 1978, 21 O.J. EUR. CoMM. 
(No. L. 295) 36, 1 Co=on Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1] 1361 (1978); Fourth Directive (on accounts and 
their publication), No. 78/660/EEC, 21 OJ. EUR. CoMM. (No. L 222) 11, 1 Co=on Mmkt. 
Rep. 1] 1371 (1978); Sixth Directive (on "divisions," sometimes known as "split-ups" and "split-
offs"), No. 82/891/EEC, 25 O.J. EUR. CoMM. (No. L 378) 47, 1 Co=on Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 
1] 1411 (1982); Seventh Directive (on consolidated accounts of affiliated groups), No. 83/349/ 
EEC, 26 OJ. EUR. CoMM. (No. L 193) l, 1 Co=on Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1] 1421 (1983); Eighth 
Directive (on auditors), No. 84/253/EEC, 27 O.J. EUR. CoMM. (No. L 126) 20, 1 Co=on Mkt. 
Rep. (CCH) 1] 1431 (1984); Eleventh Directive (on filing by branches of foreign companies), No. 
89/666/EEC, 32 O.J. EUR. CoMM. (No. L 395) 36, 1 Co=on Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1] 1443 (1989); 
Twelfth Directive (on one-member companies), No. 89/667/EEC, 32 O.J. EUR. CoMM. (No. L 
395) 40, 1 Co=on Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1] 1447 (1989). 
Frank Wooldridge counted 11 company law directives by including two that the Commission 
had not included in its ordinal enumeration, and that related not to companies in general but to 
banks and other credit institutions. See F. WOOLDRIDGE, CoMPANY LAW IN THE UNITED 
KINGDOM AND THE EUROPEAN CoMMUNITY 6-7 (1991). 
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transnational mergers, and on takeovers were on the horizon.13 
The desirability of coordinating, rather than permitting the "race 
of laxity" that was flowering on the American scene, seems to have 
been taken for granted by the Community founders. Stein's exhaus-
tive analysis of the origins of the coordination program reports rivalry 
among Eurocrats for administration of the program, 14 but no exposi-
tion of reasons for coordinating in the first place.15 The principal ex-
pression of reasons for coordination cited by Wooldridge (writing in 
1991) was an internal Community document of 1988.16 Buxbaum and 
Hopt (in 1988) discussed economic and political arguments for and 
against coordination, but did not contend that these considerations 
were in the minds of Community founders. 17 
The Treaty article that authorizes the program deepens the mys-
tery. The power to require "equivalent safeguards" is one of eight 
powers granted for the purpose of implementing "freedom of estab-
lishment,'' which embraces the freedom of individuals to work, reside, 
and acquire property in states of which they are not citizens.18 A re-
lated article provides that companies have these rights to the same 
extent as individuals.19 
But the imposition of equivalent safeguards is not a grant of free-
13. Amended proposal for a Fifth Council Directive on the structure of public limited com-
panies, 26 O.J. EUR. CoMM. (No. C 240) 2, 1 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1[ 1401 (1983) [herein-
after Fifth Directive 1983]; Proposal for a Tenth Council Directive on cross-border mergers of 
public limited companies, 28 OJ. EUR. CoMM. (No. C 23) 11, 1 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 
1[ 1439 (1985) [hereinafter Tenth Directive 1985]; Amended Commission proposal for a Thir-
teenth Council Directive on company law, concerning takeover and other general bids, 33 O.J. 
EUR. CoMM. (No. C 240) 7, 3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1[ 60,200 (1990) [hereinafter Thir-
teenth Directive 1990]. 
14. E. STEIN, supra note•, at 173-87. 
15. Stein seemed to assume that harmonization of company laws was an essential element of 
"a coherent legal order,'' which was necessary to make a unified economic system work. Id. at 6. 
He reported that coordination became in practice a tool for persuading members to remove re-
strictions on foreign companies, although he doubted that this was the intention of the authors of 
the Treaty. Id. at 37. 
16. F. WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 12, at 10 n.46. 
17. See R. BUXBAUM & K. HOPT, LEGAL HARMONIZATION AND THE BUSINESS ENTER· 
PRISE 8-11 (1988). The authors do not purport to analyze the motives of the Community foun-
ders, but only the considerations that seemed relevant to these authors in 1986. 
18. Treaty, supra note 2, art. 54, at 224. Paragraph 1 of the article directed the Council to 
abolish restrictions of freedom of establishment. Paragraph 2 directed the Council to issue direc-
tives to achieve abolition. Paragraph 3 directed the Council to promote freedom in various par-
ticular ways, such as abolishing procedures and practices that form obstacles, ensuring the rights 
of citizens of one state employed in another to remain in the state, allowing citizens of one state 
to acquire property in other states, and assuring that freedom of establishment is not distorted by 
local subsidies. The subparagraph on "safeguards" was the only clause of the article that did not 
directly further freedom of establishment, but ordered creation of conditions that would make 
freedom of establishment more acceptable. 
19. Treaty, supra note 2, art. 58, at 227. See Reindl, Companies in the European Community: 
Are the Conflict-of-Law Rules Ready for 1992?, 11 Mice. J. INTL. L. 1270, 1271-72 (1990). 
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dom, like the other clauses of the paragraph. The question remains: 
How was it supposed to contribute to freedom of establishment? The 
question is particularly puzzling to an American, who witnesses free-
dom of corporate lawmaking without "safeguards" other than those 
imposed by federal regulation of securities transactions. 
To find plausible answers, one must look beyond promotion of 
"freedom of establishment." I will offer some hypotheses based 
largely on speculation. 20 
B. Balance and Stability 
Freedom of establishment was not listed among the primary objec-
tives of the Treaty, but as a means21 of achieving objectives that were 
announced in these terms: 
The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common 
market and progressively approximating the economic policies of Mem-
ber States, to promote throughout the Community a harmonious devel-
opment of economic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an 
increase in stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of living, and 
closer relations between the States belonging to it.22 
While the Community founders may have admired the productiv-
ity of the U.S. economy, they surely did not consider it ideal in all 
respects. In the 1950s, when the Treaty was framed, its architects had 
not forgotten the American depression of the 1930s, which they some-
times blamed for their own economic troubles of the same era. They 
knew that reckless corporation finance was widely blamed as a con-
tributing cause of the depression, and that the American Congress had 
rushed in 1933 and 1934 to supplement lax state corporation laws with 
rigorous federal securities laws. 
When the Community founders articulated their aspiration for 
"continuous and balanced expansion," and for "an increase in stabil-
ity," they may well have been contemplating an economy more bal-
anced and more stable than the one they had observed in America. 
They may have believed that these objectives could be achieved only 
20. My speculations are guided partly by conversations with various European company law 
scholars, including some while I was permitted to sit in 1965 with members of a Community 
working party on the content of coordination directives. The working party comprised leading 
experts from each of the six states that were then members of the Economic Community. How-
ever, they did not discuss reasons for coordination; their reasons could be inferred only from 
their preferences among safeguards. 
21. Article 3 of the Treaty, supra note 2, at 179, lists freedom of establishment, along with 
the elimination of interstate customs duties and nine other measures as activities to be carried on, 
"For the purposes set out in Article 2 •••• " Article 2 is quoted in the text accompanying note 
22, infra. 
22. Treaty, supra note 2, art. 2, at 179. 
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by forestalling a race of laxity, and ensuring that company laws 
throughout the Community would require financial disclosure, fiscal 
prudence, and managements responsible to their constituents. 
C. Gypsies at the Gate 
The demand for safeguards may also have been a response to ap-
prehension in each country that less reliable and less responsible com-
panies of foreign countries would invade, and separate citizens from 
their wealth or their labor. The article that authorized coordination 
began by mandating the abolition of all restrictions on doing business 
by corporations of one Community state in another.23 When foreign 
corporations were admitted to a state, investors, customers, suppliers, 
moneylenders, and employees in the host state would be exposed to 
the enticements and the risks of corporations over whose organization 
and finance the host state would have no control.24 
This exposure would radically change the preexisting situation. 
Before the Communities existed, each European state was free to ex-
clude corporations of any other state from transacting business in the 
state. 25 If a host state admitted a foreign corporation, the host could 
regulate or tax the guest in any way it chose. Many bilateral treaties 
of friendship and commerce were signed to limit the degree of discrim-
ination, but discrimination remained substantial.26 
The position of foreign corporations in pre-Community Europe 
can be compared to that of out-of-state corporations (also called "for-
eign") in the United States of the nineteenth century. The U.S. consti-
tutionmak.ers had sought to assure freedom of commerce by 
discouraging states from imposing import and export taxes, 27 and 
granting to citizens of each state the rights of citizens in other states 
23. Id. art. 54(1), at 224. 
24. E. STEIN, supra note •, at 37; Abeltshauser, Towards a European Constitution of the 
Finn: Problems and Perspectives, 11 MICH. J. INTI... L. 1235, 1246-47 (1990). But see Coleman, 
The Fifth Directive and the European Company Statute, 10 BULL CoMP. LAB. REL. 247 (1979) 
(suggesting that safeguards were to be coordinated to relieve companies of the burden of comply-
ing with differing requirements in each state). 
For a recent account of an underregulated Luxembourg bank that precipitated losses in other 
countries, see Forman, BCCI Debacle Leaves an African Country All the More Troubled, Wall St. 
J., Aug. 6, 1991, at Al, col. 1; Truell, BCCI Is Fined by the Fed and Faces Fraud Charges, Wall 
St. J., July 30, 1991, at A3, cols. 1-2; Truell, Clifford Resigns Bank Post, Casualty of BCCI 
Scandal, Wall St. J., Aug. 14, 1991, at A3, cols. 1-2. 
25. E. STEIN, supra note •, at 37. 
26. Id. 
27. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2. To be more specific, the clause excluded export and 
import taxes unless they were authorized by Congress and their proceeds paid to the U.S. Treas-
ury, thus eliminating most of the incentive for states to leyy them. 
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that they might enter.28 But the founders did not mention corpora-
tions, which were too rare in the 1780s to attract their attention. 
When the right of corporations of one state to enter another was 
asserted before the Supreme Court, the Court ruled, in an opinion by 
Chief Justice Taney, that freedom of movement could not be claimed 
by citizens operating through corporations.29 Not only did a corpora-
tion lack rights outside its home state; it could "have no legal existence 
outside of the boundaries of the sovereignty by which it was 
created."30 
In order to do business in more than one state during years in 
which Taney's ontology of corporate nonexistence prevailed, enter-
prisers commonly formed a separate corporation in each state in 
which they wanted to operate, or reincorporated in other states so that 
the enterprises became simultaneously a corporation of more than one 
state.31 
The burdens of being "foreign" in a neighboring state were allevi-
ated in 1888, when the Supreme Court decided that out-of-state corpo-
rations were entitled as "persons" to due process under the fourteenth 
amendment of the U.S. Constitution.32 The burdens were further di-
minished in 1910, when the Court invoked the equal protection clause 
of the fourteenth amendment to outlaw most forms of discrimination 
against out-of-state corporations. 33 In the armor of due process and 
equal protection, enterprises could incorporate in Delaware and do 
business where they chose. 
The incubus of nonexistence survived in rules that denied access to 
28. U.S. CoNsr. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. The clause was held to invalidate discriminatory taxes on 
nonresidents, Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656 (1975); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 
(1948); Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418 (1871); and a regulation excluding nonresi-
dents, but not residents, from procuring abortions. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973). 
29. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 586 (1839). Taney reasoned that since a 
corporation is not a citizen, it could not claim the rights of a citizen. The decision reflected a 
radical difference of approach from that of the Marshall court, which had granted corporations 
access to federal courts under the "diversity of citizenship" test by viewing the corporation as an 
instrument of the citizens who constituted it. See Bank of United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 
Cranch) 61 (1809). 
30. Bank of Augusta, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) at 588. 
31. Foley, Incorporation. Multiple Incorporation. and the Conflict of Laws, 42 HARV. L. REv. 
516 (1929); Comment, Multiple Incorporation as a Form of Railroad Organization. 46 YALE LJ. 
1370 (1937). 
32. Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (18S8). 
33. Southern Ry. Co. v. Greene, 216 U.S. 400 (1910). At about the same time, some forms of 
discrimination against out-of-state corporations were invalidated under the interstate commerce 
clause. Pullman Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 56 (1910); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 
1 (1910). But the Supreme Court did not repudiate the Taney view on corporations' inability to 
claim the rights of citizens. See Walker, Foreign Corporation Laws: The Loss of Reason. 47 N.C. 
L. REV. 1 (1968). 
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justice to an out-of-state corporation that had not been "admitted" to 
the state. 34 But most states now allow out-of-state corporations to sue 
on preadmittance causes of action, once they have been admitted. 35 
The rules fuel dilatory and expensive litigation, but do not impose a 
major obstacle to interstate commerce. 
The Community founders, aware of the tortuous struggle of U.S. 
corporations for freedom of establishment, inserted in their own con-
stitution an explicit guarantee of freedom of establishment for corpo-
rations as fully as for individuals. The Treaty declared: 
Companies or firms formed in accordance with the law of a Member 
State and having their registered office, central administration or princi-
pal place of business within the Community shall, for the purposes of 
this Chapter, be treated in the same way as natural persons who are 
nationals of Member States. 36 
If the doors had been opened to foreign corporations without 
"safeguards," citizens of states with relatively rigorous laws, such as 
France and Germany, might have been exposed to the wiles of corpo-
rations of other states whose laws were already more permissive, or 
might be made more permissive in an effort to attract incorporations.37 
If corporations were permitted to sell securities and make contracts 
without adequate requirements of disclosure and of financial strength, 
economic development might fail to attain the goals of "a continuous 
and balanced expansion" and "an increase in stability," for which the 
Communities were formed.3s 
One may reasonably infer that opening the doors to the corpora-
tions of other Community states was politically acceptable only on the 
assurance that there would be "equivalent safeguards" for the protec-
tion of Community residents. 39 
D. "Interests of Members" 
The first-named function of requiring "safeguards" was "protec-
tion of the interests of members,"40 which would translate in Ameri-
34. See Walker, Foreign Corporation Laws: A Current Account, 41 N.C. L. REV. 733 (1969); 
Walker, supra note 33, at 1. 
35. See Revised Model Business Corporation Act § 15.02 (1984) [hereinafter MBCA]. 
36. Treaty, supra note 2, art. 58, at 227. Since this article makes no reference to the owner-
ship of companies, companies owned by Americans or Japanese enjoy freedom of establishment 
if they are incorporated in member states. 
37. See Gessler, Ziele und Methoden der Hannonisierung des Gesellschaftsrechts der GmbH. 
in HARMONISIERUNG DES GESELLSCHAFI'SRECHTS UND DES STEUERRECHTS DER GMBH IN 
EUROPA 9, 16-21 (1962). 
38. See Treaty, supra note 2, art. 2, at 179. 
39. E. STEIN, supra note •, at 37; Coleman, supra note 24, at 248-49. 
40. See Treaty, supra note 2, art. 54(3Xa), at 224. 
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can English as protection of the interests of shareholders. Protecting 
shareholder interests was probably viewed as a means of promoting, in 
the words of the Treaty, "a continuous and balanced expansion, an 
increase in stability, [and] aD. accelerated raising of the standard of 
living,"41 because the swindling of shareholders and the resultant dry-
ing up of capital markets were regarded as contributing causes of the 
Great Depression. 
The Community founders could, imaginably, have attacked the 
danger of reckless financing as the United States had done, by enacting 
Community Securities Acts and creating a Community Securities 
Commission. 42 But the American securities laws did not fit the Com-
munity's legislative pattern, which favored integration of reforms in 
existing codes, rather than adding uncoordinated regulations. The 
two largest members of the original Communities, France and Ger-
many, had tackled securities fraud by inserting rigorous provisions for 
disclosure and auditing of financial statements in their corporation 
laws.43 None of the Community's member states had adopted laws on 
the order of the "blue sky laws" that were among the precursors of the 
U.S. Securities Act of 1933.44 Only one Community member, 
Belgium, had created an agency that was remotely comparable to the 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.4s 
Besides, the Community founders were not concerned only with 
"truth in securities," the prime objective of the U.S. securities laws.46 
They were concerned with many other forms of shareholder protec-
tion, including the maintenance of capital,47 the equal treatment of 
shareholders, 48 and the proportionality of voting rights, 49 all of which 
fit better in corporation laws than in securities laws on the American 
pattern. 
If the Community founders thought at all about the U.S. system of 
41. See Treaty, supra note 2, art. 2, at 224. 
42. Cf. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1988); Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811 (1988). 
43. For observations on disclosure requirements in effect when the Economic Community 
was formed, see Conard, Organizing for Business, in 2 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE EURO-
PEAN CoMMON MARKET: A LEGAL PROFILE 1, 141-45 (1960). For more recent observations, 
see Buxbaum, Formation of Marketable Share Companies, in 13 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPE-
DIA OF CoMPARATIVE LAW§ 3-31 (1971). 
44. For a brief explanation of blue sky laws, see L. Loss, supra note 2, at 8-12, 29-381; 1 L. 
Loss & J. SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 29-157 (3d ed. 1989). 
45. See Conard, supra note 43, at 145-47. 
46. See L. Loss, supra note 2, at 29-37; L. Loss & J. SELIGMAN, supra note 44, at 171-93. 
47. See Second Directive, supra note 12, art. 15. 
48. See Second Directive, supra note 12, art. 42. 
49. See Fifth Directive 1983, supra note 13, art. 33(1). 
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securities regulation as a model for Europe, they probably dismissed it 
as an expedient to which Congress had turned because of the constitu-
tional and political impediments to intruding on state sovereignty in 
the design of corporation laws. By providing at the outset for Com-
munity directives on corporation law, they bypassed the constitutional 
obstacle. Since no member state had yet developed a business of char-
ter mongering, there was no vested interest in a free market in corpo-
rate laws. 
E. The Interests of "Others" 
The "others" whom the Community founders envisioned as sub-
jects of protection were presumably customers, suppliers, and money-
lenders, including investors in bonds. All of them would be helped by 
regulations requiring public filing of the addresses and the officers of 
corporations, by standard accounting practices and disclosures, and by 
capital requirements designed to maintain firm solvency. Securities 
regulation on the American model would help only the bond investors. 
In what respects employees were contemplated by the Community 
founders as among the "others" for whom safeguards were to be pro-
vided is unclear. They were doubtless intended to benefit in the same 
way as suppliers and shareholders from provisions designed to assure 
financial solvency. Whether the Treaty makers intended also to au-
thorize their protection by means of a voice in corporate governance is 
debatable. 
Employee representation in governance was already known in Eu-
rope through Germany's codetermination law, introduced in 1952.so 
But it was not, when the Communities were founded, embedded in the 
German corporation law, which still declared that the supervisory 
board should be elected by the shareholders.st Employee representa-
tion was, however, included in the 1972 proposal of a fifth directive on 
corporate governance,s2 and in revised form in the 1983 revision.s3 
The difficulty in reaching agreement on the terms of employee repre-
sentation suggests that some Community members do not consider it a 
SO. See Summers, Worker Participation in the U.S. and West Germany: A Comparative Per-
spective, 28 AM. J. CoMP. L. 367, 370 (1980); Conard, supra note 43, at 102-0S. 
SI. Gesetz iiber Aktiengesellschaften und Kommanditgesellschaften auf Aktien of Jan. 30, 
1937, RGBl.I 107 § 87 (1937) [hereinafter AktG 1937]. In 1976, the law was revised to state that 
members should be elected by employees to the extent required by the Law on Codetermination. 
German Stock Corporation Law of Sept. 6, 196S, as amended July 1, 1976 (R. Mueller & E. 
Galbraith trans. 1976) [hereinafter Ger. SCL.]. 
S2. Proposal for a fifth directive, lS J.O. CoMM. EUR. (No. C 131) 49 (1972) [hereinafter 
Fifth Directive 1972]. 
S3. Fifth Directive 1983, supra note 13, arts. 2la-21j (amended proposals). 
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safeguard that is essential to attaining the objectives of the 
Communities. s4 
F. National Interests 
Beyond the interests of shareholders, customers, suppliers, money-
lenders, and employees, a significant source of pressure for conformity 
in corporation laws was probably the interest of each state in retaining 
as its "nationals" those corporations whose operations are centered in 
the state. The founders of the Community had no intention of letting 
one of the member states become the "Delaware of Europe." 
This may have been related to a sense of national loyalty. Euro-
pean states were sensitive to the implications of their giant corpora-
tions defecting to other states. A related sensitivity was recognized in 
the preface to the Commission's 1989 proposal of a Statute for a Euro-
pean Company. In explaining why it proposed a "European" com-
pany, rather than merely specifying conditions for a national 
company, the preface explained: "This Statute based on European law 
will be a means of overcoming major psychological obstacles, since it 
will avoid placing the firms concerned in the position of having to 
choose the structure of a particular Member State ... . "ss It was 
probably a matter of finance, too. Community members would not 
want a one-member state to siphon off a disproportionate fraction of 
corporation filing fees and attorneys' fees as Delaware does in the 
United States. s6 
If there is anything surprising about the decision to standardize 
European corporation law, it is the absence of any organized effort of 
European industrialists to create in Europe a free trade in corporation 
laws like that which flourishes in the United States. When German 
industrialists found themselves exposed to competition from poten-
tially less regulated Luxembourg rivals, they might conceivably have 
wanted the right to enjoy Luxembourg laxity by moving their corpo-
rate headquarters to Luxembourg. There is no evidence, however, 
that the captains of European industry perceived a "race of laxity" as 
advantageous to them. If they contemplated it at all, they probably 
recognized that a free market in corporation laws could not prevail in 
the political climate of Europe. They may also have believed that dif-
ferences in company laws would be eclipsed by differences in laws on 
taxation, social security, and other matters. 
54. See infra text accompanying notes 185-87, 230-33. 
55. Statute for a European Company, BULL. E.C., May 1989, at 7. 
56. Cf. Cary, supra note 5, at 668. 
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II. THE INSTRUMENTS OF CoORDINATION 
A. The Rejection of American Models 
The Community founders adopted none of the principal methods 
by which nationwide conformity of laws has sometimes been achieved 
in the United States - the "uniform act," the "model act," and the 
"federal act." 
The "uniform act" and the "model act," as known in the United 
States, were inappropriate because their adoption is voluntary. 
Although the American Commissioners57 have been successful with 
uniform laws on commercial transactions, and even with laws as close 
to corporations as the partnership and limited partnership acts, their 
only attempt to unify corporation laws was abandoned. 58 There was 
no prospect of Delaware's abandoning its program of attracting incor-
porations by being nonuniform. So long as Delaware attracted corpo-
rations by laxity, other states were sure to follow along to avoid losing· 
incorporations.59 Europeans had no reason to believe that voluntary 
conformity in corporation laws would succeed in the Communities 
any more than it had succeeded in the United States. 
The Model Business Corporation Act issued by the American Bar 
Association's Committee on Corporate Laws was successful in that its 
provisions were copied or simulated in a majority of states, but it was 
essentially an "enabling act," imposing few "safeguards," and being 
frequently amended to meet the demands of corporation organizers for 
greater liberties. 60 A "model act" was no instrument for assuring 
"equivalent safeguards" in the European Communities. 
Likely reasons for the Communities' forgoing the enactment of a 
Community corporation act, which would be comparable to a federal 
corporation act in the United States, were of a different kind. One 
reason, which would have been sufficient even if there had been no 
others, was the enormity of the task of devising a complete corpora-
tion act that would be acceptable to the many members of the Com-
munity, with their differing languages and traditions. Much more 
feasible was the gradual coordination of particular elements, starting 
57. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. 
58. NATIONAL CoNFERENCE OF CoMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, HANDBOOK 
OF THE NATIONAL CoNFERENCE OF CoMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PRO-
CEEDINGS 72 (1943). 
59. See Kaplan, Foreign Corporations and Local Corporate Policy, 21 VAND. L. REv. 433 
(1968). 
60. See Harris, The Model Business Corporation Act -An Invitation to l"esponsibility?, 50 
Nw. U. L. REv. 1 (1955). 
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with registration and then proceeding to capital maintenance, then to 
accounting, and so on. 
A second plausible reason for forgoing a single Community corpo-
ration act may have been a desire to minimize the inconvenience 
caused, and the disparagement of national traditions implied, by a dis-
placement of existing corporation laws. Compatible with these possi-
ble considerations, the Treaty authorized coordinating only 
"safeguards," and coordinating these only "to the necessary extent."61 
A third reason, one may guess, is avoiding displacement or dupli-
cation of the bureaucracies of state officials employed in keeping cor-
porate records. A Community bureaucracy to administer a 
Community law would have the added complication of dealing with 
documents in several different languages, which numbered four 
(French, German, Italian, and Dutch) when the Community was 
founded. By 1991, there were five more - Danish, English, Greek, 
Spanish, and Portuguese. 
B. The Directive 
What the Community needed in order to coordinate safeguards 
without imposing a whole new corporation act in four languages was a 
means of causing the member states to modify their own acts in se-
lected respects. For this purpose they adopted an instrument that they 
called a "directive," a term that had been applied previously to various 
kinds of interagency orders, 62 but was unencumbered by international 
or constitutional case law. The Treaty provided: "A directive shall be 
binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member State to 
which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the 
choice of form and methods."63 
Although the idea of a federal government ordering member states 
to legislate seems strange to an American, it is not very different in 
reality from the practice by which U.S. federal agencies grant highway 
61. See supra text accompanying note 11. 
62. "Directive" in the English version of the Treaty was a translation of the French directive 
and German Richtlinie. A pretreaty French dictionary defined directive as a "group of instruc-
tions, line of conduct to be followed, etc., which the higher military authority in campaign gives 
to its subordinates, or, by analogy, general instructions given by a religious, political, etc., au-
thority." NOUVEAU PETIT LAROUSSE ILLUSTRE DICTIONNAIRE ENCYCLOPEDIQUE 307 (1956) 
(author's translation). The original Oxford English Dictionary treated the term as obsolete, 2 
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 391 (1933), but the 1972 Supplement revived it as "a general 
instruction how to proceed or act," with quotations illustrating its use to describe, among other 
things, ecclesiastical interferences with the political life of nations, military directions to armies, 
and the British government's wartime directions to the BBC on handling news. 1 OXFORD ENG-
LISH DICTIONARY 811 (Supp. 1972). 
63. Treaty, supra note 2, art. 189, at 305. 
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money to states on condition of the states adopting and enforcing uni-
form speed limits. 64 In form, it resembles the process by which an 
international treaty requires signatory states to modify their laws to 
match the treaty. 
Unsympathetic parliamentarians, however, could regard the direc-
tives as an unconstitutional infringement of parliamentary supremacy 
- an argument that was forcefully advanced in Great Britain by op-
ponents of British entry into the Common Market. 65 The imaginable 
sensitivity of national parliaments to Community dictation was allevi-
ated by long delays between proposal and adoption, during which a 
directive could be adapted to national differences, and national parlia-
ments could adapt or prepare to adapt their laws to the prospective 
directive. Even the first directive, which seemed to do little more than 
to standardize basic disclosure, spent four years in the form of a pro-
posal before it could be enacted without vigorous objection. 66 The 
twenty-year gestation of the fifth directive reflects a continuing policy 
of reciprocal adaptation. 
C. The Community Corporation Act 
Soon after the Economic Community was founded, its leaders be-
came concerned with the need for corporations to operate on a Com-
munity-wide scale in order to realize the potential of the Community 
market. One approach was to authorize companies of different coun-
tries to form alliances to work together, which was accomplished by 
the creation of an entity called a "European Economic Interest 
Grouping. "67 But members of a Grouping would still do business 
under their own names, and be associated with particular member 
states. 
Community leaders concluded that enterprisers should be enabled 
to form "Community corporations" that would not be viewed as "na-
tionals" of any particular member, nor subject to idiosyncracies of na-
64. See, e.g., Nevada v. Skinner, 884 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1112 
(1990) (discussing constitutional objections to national speed limit). 
65. See Brothwood, Parliamentary Sovereignty and U.K. Entry, 118 NEW LJ. 415 (1968); 
Comment, European Economic Community Law vs. United Kingdom Law: A Doctrinal Di-
lemma, 53 1'ExAs L. REv. 1032 (1975). For a defense of the compatibility of Community law 
with Parliamentary sovereignty, see Legal and Constitutional Implications of United Kingdom 
Membership of the European Communities, 1967, CMND. 3301; Simmonds, Common Law and 
Community Law, 111 Souc. J. 644 (1967); Note, Community Law, the Act of Union and the 
Supremacy of Parliament, 92 LAW Q. REV. 36 (1976). 
66. E. STEIN, supra note•, at 237-312. 
67. Council Regulation No. 2137/85 of 25 July 1985 on the European Economic Interest 
Grouping (EEIG), 28 J.O. CoMM. EUR. (No. L 199) 1 (1985). 
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tional laws. 68 To this end, they conceived a company that would be 
European, rather than French, German, or Luxembourgian. To give 
it a name that would not identify it with the language of any particular 
country, they dubbed it in Latin "Societas europaea,,, abbreviated as 
"SE."69 
The Treaty, however, did not contain any authorization that 
plainly contemplated the enactment of a Community corporation 
act. 70 The directive power seemed inapplicable to this purpose, be-
cause it authorized only orders to member states to modify their na-
tional laws. 71 The Treaty granted to the Council and Commission 
power to "make regulations" in order to "carry out their task, "72 but 
there were early doubts about what "task," if any, would be carried 
out by authorizing formation of a European company. 73 
In the 1970s, Community theorists debated the source of authority 
for the European Company Statute. Some argued that it was a proper 
regulation under article 100, while others invoked article 235, which 
authorizes the Community to "take appropriate measures" when the 
Treaty has not provided the necessary powers to attain one of the 
objectives of the Community.74 
The 1970 and 1975 drafts of the SE Statute cited as their authori-
zation the "appropriate measures" clause of article 235.75 The 1989 
revision divided the proposal into two parts, a regulation authorizing 
formation of companies, and a directive ordering the member states to 
require employee representation in European Companies based in 
member States. The regulation cited the authority under article lOOA 
to adopt "measures" for the establishment and functioning of the in-
68. Proposition de riglement (CEE) du Conseil portant statut de la societi anonyme 
europlenne, 13 J.O. CoMM. EuR. (No. C 124) 1 (1970) (Proposal for a Council Regulation on the 
Statute for European Companies) [hereinafter SE Stat. 1970]; Proposal far a Council Regulation 
on the Statute for European Componies, BULL. E.C. SUPP., Apr. 1975, at 1 [hereinafter SE Stat. 
1975]; Proposal for a Council Regulation on a Statute for a European Company, BULL. E.C. 
SUPP., May 1989, at 37 [hereinafter SE Stat. 1989]. 
69. SE Stat. 1970, supra note 68, art. 1(1), at 3. 
70. E. STEIN, supra note•, at 427. 
71. Id. 
72. Treaty, supra note 2, art. 189, at 305. 
73. E. STEIN, supra note•, at 445 n.316. 
74. The text of article 235 is as follows: 
If action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in the course of the opera-
tion of the common market, one of the objectives of the Community and this Treaty has not 
provided the necessary powers, the Council shall, operating unanimously on a proposal 
from the Commission and after consulting the Assembly, take the appropriate measures. 
Treaty, supra note 2, art. 235, at 335. 
75. SE Stat. 1975, supra note 68, preamble, at 11; SE Stat. 1970, supra note 68, preamble, at 
1. 
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ternal market, 76 while the directive cited the authority to prescribe 
"equivalent ... safeguards."77 
Although an SB would owe its existence entirely to Community 
legislation, the Communities did not propose to set up a Community 
registry of SBs. Bach SB would file its articles of incorporation and its 
periodic reports in the company registry of a member state, where it 
would have its h~dquarters. 78 If questions of company law should 
arise that were not answered by the SB statute, they would be decided 
under the law of the state of incorporation. 79 
At this writing (mid-1991), the SB Statute was reputed to have a 
good chance of being adopted by the end of 1992. 
D. The Lawmakers 
Of the many original elements of Community structure, none dif-
fers more conspicuously from U.S. counterparts than the lawmaking 
authority. The legislative function is divided between the Council and 
the Commission, none of whose members are popularly elected to 
these bodies; they are named by the governments of member states. 80 
Council members must be members of the "governments"81 (that is, 
the cabinets) of the states, and as such responsible to their national 
parliaments. Some of them are members of national parliaments, and 
subject to popular election in that capacity, but not in their capacities 
of Community Councillors. 
In this respect the Communities followed the tradition of interna-
tional organizations, whose primary constituents are not citizens, but 
states. 82 This conception of the Communities is expressed in the pre-
amble of the Treaty, which speaks as a proclamation not of "We the 
76. SE Stat. 1989, supra note 68, preamble, at 37 (citing Treaty, supra note 2, art. 100A, at 
255, added by Single European Act, supra note 1, art. 18, at 8). 
77. Proposal/or a Council directive complementing the Statute/or a European Company with 
regard to the involvement of employees in the European Company, BULL. E.C. SUPP., May 1989, 
preamble, at 69 [hereinafter SE Directive 1989] (citing Treaty, supra note 2, art. 54, at 224). 
78. SE Stat. 1989, supra note 68, arts. 8 & 9, at 40 (incorporating by reference First Direc-
tive, supra note 12, arts. 2, 3, at 9-10). 
79. SE Stat. 1989, supra note 68, art. 7(3), at 40. 
80. Traill Instituant un conseil unique et une commission unique des communautls europeen-
nes, J.O. CoMM. EUR. (No. 152), arts. 2, 11, 10, at 2, 4, 5-6 (1967); Treaty Establishing a Single 
Council and a Single Commission of the European Communities in TREATIES EsTABLISIDNG 
THE EUROPEAN CoMMUNITIES 745, 751, 755-56 (1973). On the bureaucratic and undemocratic 
nature of Community legislation, see Allott, Memorandum, in SELECT CoMMrrrBE ON TIIE 
EUROPEAN CoMMUNITIES, POLITICAL UNION: LAW-MAKING POWERS AND PROCEDURES, 
(U.K.) H.L. Session 1990-91, 17th Report, Evidence 35 (1991) .. 
81. Traill Instituant un conseil unique et une commission unique des commuantls europeenes, 
supra note 80, art. 2, at 4. 
82. See B. BEUTLER, R. BIEBER, J. PIPXORN & J. STREIL, DIB EUROPAISCHE OBMEIN• 
SCHAFI' - Rl!cHTSORDNUNG UND POLITIX 107 (3d ed. 1987), translated in J. WEILER, 1992 -
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People,"83 but of a king, a queen, a grand duchess, and three 
presidents. 84 
The power to legislate, whether by directive, by regulation, or by 
other "appropriate measures," is vested in the Council on a proposal 
of the Commission.85 In the original Treaty, the Council was directed 
to "consult" the Assembly and in some cases other agencies. 86 But the 
Single European Act of 1987 changed the procedure for coordination 
of company laws from "consultation" to "cooperation," and defined 
"cooperation" as submission to a vote of the European' Parliament, the 
Assembly's successor. The vote of the Parliament cannot be overrid-
den except by a unanimous vote of the Council. s1 Since the Council 
would rarely be unanimous in approving a proposal rejected by a ma-
jority of the Parliament, the Parliament has virtually the same power 
of decision as the U.S. Congress, although it has less authority to initi-
ate. In the exercise of its function of cooperation, the Parliament de-
bates and votes not only on the proposal of the ComniiSsion, but also 
on numerous amendments proposed by Parliamentarians. 88 By the 
cooperation procedure, the Parliament has achieved a substantial 
power over the content of legislation. 
III. WHAT KINDS OF CORPORATIONS? 
The Community lawmakers decided at the outset to coordinate on 
two different levels. Some safeguards, like those requiring registration 
of name, address, and authoriied representatives, were to apply to all 
corporations, large and small. Other directives, like those on mainte-
nance of capital, mergers, and split-ups, would apply only to corpora-
tions that were likely to be publicly held. 
Defining the enterprises that would fall into the two regimes was 
complicated, because the laws of member states characterized their 
TRADING IN AND W11ll EUROPE: INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CoMMUNI-
TIES unit I, at 37 (teaching materials, University of Michigan Law School, 1990). 
83. U.S. CoNsr. preamble. 
84. Treaty, supra note 2, preamble, at 173. 
85. The various legislative powers were assigned by different articles, scattered throughout 
the Treaty. For a summary, see Stein, The New Institutions. in 2 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN 
THE EUROPEAN CoMMON MARKET: A LEGAL PROFILE, supra note 43, at 33-43. With respect 
to directives to coordinate safeguards, the Treaty provided in art. 54(2) as follows: "[T]he Coun-
cil shall, on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the Economic and Social 
Committee and the Assembly, issue directives, acting unanimously until the end of the first stage 
and by a qualified majority thereafter." Treaty, supra note 2, art. 54(2), at 224. 
86. See, e.g., Treaty, supra note 2, arts. 54(2), 100, 235, at 224, 255, 335. 
87. Treaty, supra note 2, art. 149, at 295, as amended by Single European Act, supra note 1, 
art. 7, at 5. 
88. See, e.g., Statute for a European Company - Cooperative Society, 34 O.J. EUR. CoMM. 
(No. C 48) 72-99 (1991). 
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various forms of business enterprises in different ways that defied 
translation. Each directive lists the kinds of companies affected in 
each country in the language of that country, using (for example) so-
ciete anonyme and naamloze venootschap for Belgium, aktieselskabet 
for Denmark, and so on, including a characterization in the Greek 
alphabet for Greece. 
To simplify the complex classifications used by the directives, I 
will group the affected kinds of companies in two main classes, which I 
will call "public" and "private," although the directives do not use 
these terms, except for British and Irish entities. Public companies in 
this context embrace companies that are authorized by the laws under 
which they are formed to issue freely negotiable shares. Private com-
panies are those that are restrained by law from allowing their shares 
to be freely traded on securities markets. 
Although this distinction is reminiscent of the one drawn by 
American securities laws between companies that do and those that do 
not make public offerings of securities, it depends on the legal capacity 
to issue freely tradeable shares, rather than on the actual public issu-
ance of shares. 
The companies that I call public are those that are legally so desig-
nated in Great Britain and Ireland, and those that are designated in 
other countries by a sobriquet that includes a derivative of the Latin 
actio or a derivative or translation of the Greek anonyme. 89 They in-
clude not only the forms of organization commonly translated as "ne-
gotiable share company" or "stock corporation" (Italian societd per 
azioni, German Aktiengesellschaft, Danish aktieselskabet, French so-
ciete anonyme, Spanish and Portuguese sociedad anonima, and 
Netherlands naamloze venootschap), but also some less familiar Euro-
pean forms commonly translated as "limited partnerships with negoti-
able shares" (Italian societd in accomandita per azioni, German 
Kommanditgesellschaft auf Aktien, Danish kommandit-aktieselskab, 
French sociite en commandite par actions, Spanish sociedad com-
manditaria por acciones, Portuguese sociedade em comandita por ac-
<;.ones, and Netherlands commanditaire vennootschap op aandelen),9° 
The companies that I call private include those that are legally so 
designated in Great Britain and Ireland, and companies of other coun-
89. Azione and Aktie designate a kind of share tltat is interchangeable with other shares, and 
is represented by a transferable certificate, as distinguished from the kind of share that one might 
own in a house or a partnership that is not interchangeable with other shares, and is not freely 
negotiable. Anonyme and anonima refer to the fact that publicly held companies were originally 
designated by a characterization of their business (like "General Electric Company"), rather 
than by the names of their owners (like "J.P. Morgan & Co."). 
90. These designations are listed in First Directive, supra note 12, art. 1. 
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tries that are designated in foreign languages by equivalents of "llin-
ited liability company," as in the French societe a responsabilite 
limitee, the Italian societa a responsabilita limitata, the Spanish socie-
dad de responsabilidad limitada, and the German Gesellschaft mit 
beschriinkter Haftung (GmbH).91 The equivalents of "limited" are 
not used to distinguish private companies from public companies, in 
which liability is equally limited, but to distinguish them from partner-
ships. They resemble partnerships in that the names of their owners 
frequently appear in their company names, but differ in that the 
named owners are not normally liable for firm debts. 
Three of the directives that had been adopted by the end of 1991 
(those dealing with capital, merger, and split-ups) and two that had 
been proposed (those on governance and on cross-border mergers) ap-
plied only to public companies. Five directives in effect - those deal-
ing with identification (domestic and foreign), accounts (simple and 
consolidated), and auditing - applied to both public and private com-
panies. The directive on one-member companies was limited, natu-
rally, to private companies. 
The accounting directives drew a further distinction between the 
largest companies and those that were smaller. Member states could 
allow the smaller companies to present simpler financial statements, 
and to forgo consolidation of subsidiaries.92 The line of demarcation, 
which involved three factors,93 was on the same order of magnitude as 
the SEC's five-million dollar asset line for reporting under the Securi-
ties Exchange Act. 94 
IV. THE CONTENT OF THE SAFEGUARDS 
The safeguards that are required or proposed to be required are 
scattered among several directives in a pattern that reflects the order 
in which national representatives reached consensus on successive 
points, rather than any logical progression. Some of them correspond 
more closely to elements of U.S. securities law than to elements of U.S. 
corporation acts. To provide a coherent view of the safeguards, I pres-
91. Id. Belgium designates its limited liability company as societe de personnes a respon-
sabilite limitee (in French) and personenvennootschap met beperkte aansprakelijkheid (in Dutch). 
Portugal calls its limited liability company sociededade por quotes de responsabilidade limitada. 
92. Fourth Directive, supra note 12, art. 27; Seventh Directive, supra note 12, art. 6. 
93. "Smaller companies" for this purpose were companies that fell below two of these three 
measures: assets of 4 million EVA (about $5 million), revenues of 8 million EVA (about $10 
million), and employees numbering 250. Fourth Directive, supra note 12, art. 27. 
94. See Rule 12g-1 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-1 (1990). 
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ent here a list of the principal subjects of regulation,95 followed by 
designations of the directives in which each subject appears: 
Identification: firm name, address, officers, documents. 
First and eleventh directives. 
Capital: creation and maintenance. 
First and second directives. 
Financial disclosure: accounting, auditing, publication. 
Fourth, seventh, eighth, and eleventh directives. 
Mergers and split-ups, domestic and interstate. 
Third and sixth (final) and tenth (proposed) directives. 
One-member companies. 
Twelfth directive. 
Governance: powers of shareholders and employees. 
Fifth directive (proposed). 
Takeovers: conduct and responses. 
Thirteenth directive (proposed). 
Many of the safeguards, both those proposed and those adopted, 
reappear in the proposed SE statute.96 Although the primary function 
of this document is to authorize the formation of "European Compa-
nies/' it may prove to be even more useful as a model of a statute 
designed from its inception to conform to the directives. Community 
members that have patched old corporation laws with amendments to 
satisfy the directives may find in the SE statute a pattern for recodifi-
cation. American advocates of corporate law reform may find it sug-
gestive of appropriate contents for American "minimum standards." 
B. Identification: Filing and Announcement 
The first concern of the coordinators was to standardize the ele-
ments of identity that firms must put on public record. 97 Most of the 
requirements in this category look very much like the incorporation 
procedures of U.S. corporation codes. As in the United States, the 
duties include filing each firm's formative documents98 along with the 
names of its officers99 and its home office address. 100 
95. Most of the directives impose, as suggested by the word "safeguard,'' restrictions on 
corporations and their managers. But two of them, the merger and the one-member directives, 
contain also liberations from constraints of prior law. See infra text accompanying notes 158·59 
and 178-79. 
96. SE Stat. 1989, supra note 68. 
97. First Directive, supra note 12, preamble. 
98. Id. art. 2(1). 
99. Id. art. 2(1)(d). 
100. The first directive does not specifically mention the original address, but specifies filing 
"any transfer of the seat of the company." Id. art. 2(1)(g) (author's translation). The second 
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Each member state must maintain a central register for all its com-
panies; 101 separate registers in different cities or regions (like Bavaria 
in Germany or Scotland in Great Britain) would not suffice, although 
the states would be free to maintain them in addition to the national 
register. Firms formed in other Community states are required, on 
entering a state, to deposit the same kinds of documents as domestic 
firms. 102 Like the United States, the Communities refrained from es-
tablishing a single register embracing all the member states. 
These requirements seem so basic that one might expect to find 
them in force in all the member countries without any need for coordi-
nation. But there are a few interesting features that are unfamiliar to 
U.S. corporation lawyers. In addition to disclosing its identity in a 
public filing, a corporation must designate on all its correspondence 
and order forms the state in which it is registered, the serial number of 
its-registration, the legal form of the company, and the location of its 
home office.103 
Another distinctive requirement, also designed to protect suppli-
ers, customers, and employees, is the naming of individuals who "are 
authorized to represent the company in dealings with third parties and 
in legal proceedings."104 The filing of a foreign branch must name not 
only the officers who can bind the company at its home office, but also 
those who can act for the foreign branch.105 
This requirement contrasts sharply with U.S. corporation acts, 
which do not require that officers have any power to bind the com-
pany. The only assurance of officers' authority that American law 
gives to outsiders is a presumption that a president has authority to 
bind the corporation in acts of a customary sort;106 some cases with-
hold even this presumption.107 Although a foreign branch must name 
a resident agent, the agent has no statutory authority beyond the au-
thority to receive service of process.1os 
The directive further reinforces the authority of officers by elimi-
directive, which covers only public companies, requires specification of the "registered office." 
Second Directive, supra note 12, art. 3(a). 
101. First Directive, supra note 12, art. 3(1). 
102. Eleventh Directive, supra note 12, arts. 1-6. 
103. First Directive, supra note 12, art. 4. 
104. Id. art. 2(1)(d)(i) (author's translation). 
105. Eleventh Directive, supra note 12, art. 8(h). 
106. See Italo-Petroleum Corp. of Am. v. Hannigan, 40 Del. 534, 14 A.2d 401 (1940). 
107. See, e.g., Kelly v. Citizens Fin. Co. of Lowell, 306 Mass. 531, 28 N.E.2d 1005 (1940). 
108. MBCA, supra note 35, § 15.lO(a). 
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nating the defense known to Anglophones as ultra vires, 109 and a de-
fense less widely known called "nullity of the company."110 These 
requirements would be unnecessary in the United States, but were 
needed in some of the Community states. 
C. Capital: Creation and Maintenance 
Among the safeguards that the Communities had enacted by 1991, 
those that present the greatest contrast with American corporation 
laws are those that regulate capital in "public companies."111 They 
are reminiscent of rules that prevailed in U.S. corporation acts before 
the 1970s, 112 but they are more rigid in detail than those ever were. 
They require not only disclosure, as U.S. securities laws do, but also 
the maintenance of capital at prescribed levels. 
Both public and private companies must disclose annually the 
amount of capital that has been subscribed.113 Public companies must 
also disclose the initial amount in the articles of incorporation, and 
subsequent amounts in annual and occasional reports. 114 The direc-
tive prescribes no particular amount for private companies, but public 
companies must have subscriptions in the amount of 25,000 Ecum 
(about $30,000). 
It is hard to believe that the requirement of "subscribed" capital 
serves any useful function today. It is related to financial practices 
that were apparently fairly common in the United States, and presum-
ably in Europe, in the late nineteenth century. Corporations were or-
ganized by individuals who subscribed for shares (that is, promised to 
buy them) to be paid for progressively as the company's needs for 
money developed. In the late twentieth century, this practice was cer-
tainly rare in the United States, and probably in Europe, too. Since 
109. First Directive, supra note 12, art. 9. The effect is similar to that ofMBCA, supra note 
35, § 3.04. 
110. First Directive, supra note 12, arts. 10-12. "Nullity" was the name of a doctrine that 
when a firm purporting to be a corporation had failed to comply with the essentials of incorpora-
tion, its undertakings were binding on no one. The directive requires that the enterprise be 
bound by the officers' undertakings, although the enterprise may have to be wound up. Id. art. 
12. Similar fact situations in the United States would usually result either in holding the pur-
ported corporation liable as a de facto corporation, or holding the organizers liable as persons 
who purported to exercise corporate powers without authority to do so, under the MBCA, supra 
note 35, § 2.04. 
111. Second Directive, supra note 12. 
112. For a deconstructive analysis of earlier U.S. capital requirements, see B. MANNING & J. 
HANKs, LEGAL CAPITAL 20-43 (3d ed. 1990). 
113. First Directive, supra note 12, art. 2(1)(e). 
114. Second Directive, supra note 12, art. 2, requires reporting in the articles of incorpora-
tion and at subsequent times when the amount of authorized capital is increased. 
115. Id. art. 6(1). 
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the collection of subscriptions is likely to become difficult at the very 
moment when it is most needed, the directive's requirement of sub-
scribed capital seems pointless. 
Of greater practical importance than the capital subscribed is the 
capital paid in. Under the directive, states must require a public com-
pany to have paid in capital of a quarter of the subscribed amount, or 
a minimum of 6250 ECU116 (about $7500). Although this is larger 
than the minimum of $1000 that some U.S. states still required in the 
1970s, 117 it is too small to offer meaningful protection to creditors of a 
going concern. Its useful function, if any, is to require company foun-
ders to put some real assets at risk before they rent space and hire 
help. 
If the capital safeguards offer any significant protection to credi-
tors, it lies in their application to the capital that is actually paid in 
and reported in :financial statements. In order to obtain credit, compa-
nies are likely to collect and report assets in amounts that bear a rea-
sonable relation to the risks of their business. 
In order to constitute paid-in capital, the directive requires that 
payments be made in cash or in other elements "capable of economic 
assessment," not in future services.118 If the payments are in any me-
dium but cash, they must be appraised by an "expert," unless they 
amount to less than ten percent of the reported capital and their value 
is guaranteed in other ways. 119 Once the capital is paid in, companies 
are forbidden to make dividend payments or share repurchases that 
would reduce it. 120 
Beside these requirements, which seem designed to protect share-
holders and creditors by assuring the company's solvency, others are 
designed to protect shareholders from discriminatory treatment. One 
article categorically demands equal treatment of shareholders of the 
same class.121 Another forbids issuing any share for less than its nom-
inal or accounting-par value.122 This prohibition is presumably in-
tended to protect shareholders who have paid par from having their 
116. Id. art. 9(1). 
117. See 2 MODEL Bus. CoRP. Acr ANN. 2D 174 (1971) (reporting $1000 minima in Con-
necticut, Kansas, Minnesota, New Jersey, and Tennessee, and $500 minima in Florida, Missouri, 
and Ohio). 
118. Second Directive, supra note 12, art. 7. 
119. Id. art. 10. The value of the consideration must be guaranteed by the recipients of the 
shares, which must be companies with "reserves" equal to the value ascribed to the considera-
tion. In addition, the waiver of appraisal must be agreed to by all incorporators, and must be 
published. 
120. Id. arts. 15, 19. 
121. Id. art. 42. 
122. Id. art. 8. The directive's terms are "nominal value" and "accountable par." The com-
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equity diluted by issuance to others at lower prices.123 
The Communities' requirement of reporting and maintainingpaid-
in capital stands in sharp contrast with the deliberate abandonment of 
capital protections in most U.S. states, and raises the question whether 
the United States or the European Community is misguided, or 
whether there are economic and social differences between the conti-
nents that call for different regimes. One function of maintaining net 
worth is to provide a margin of safety for creditors. A more important 
function is to give managers and major shareholders an incentive to 
maintain the company's solvency. When shareholders have no sub-
stantial equity,. like many shareholders in U.S. savings and loan as-
sociations in the 1980s, they have little to lose by making reckless 
investments. 
One of the arguments advanced to support the American abandon-
ment of capital regulation was the ease with which "stated capital" 
could be reduced, as a consequence of which anyone who relied on a 
declaration of stated capital at one moment could be disappointed by 
its speedy reduction and dissipation.124 This weakness in the U.S. sys-
tem of capital protection is dealt with in the Community directive by a 
provision requiring publication of a decision to reduce capital, where-
upon creditors would have the right to demand security, and distribu-
tions would be forbidden until creditors were satisfied, or a court 
determined that they were not entitled to satisfaction.125 
Another set of arguments for the American position was that cred-
itors can learn from published financial reports and from credit report-
ing agencies about the solvency of their debtors, and choose the risks 
that they want to undertake.126 This argument is less persuasive in the 
Communities because of different languages and different sources of 
financial information in the different countries, and, probably, a less-
ened availability of financial news and credit reporting within some of 
the member states. 
For both sets of reasons, the Community regime for the protection 
pany may receive less than the nominal or accountable par value to the extent of sales commis· 
sion paid to brokers. 
123. The prohibition has a protective effect if shares are normally sold for their nominal or 
par value, or only slightly more. If, however, their nominal or par values are set at derisory 
figures like one cent while the shares are sold for prices like ten dollars, as often happens in the 
United States, the underpar prohibition becomes ineffective. For reasons that are not clear to 
this author, the practice of setting nominal or par values far under actual issue prices does not 
appear to have flourished in Europe . 
. 124. See B. MANNING & J. HANKs, supra note 112, at 91-94. 
125. Fourth Directive, supra note 12, art. 32. 
126. See B. MANNING & J. HANKs, supra note 112, at 98-99. 
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of paid-in capital seems likely to be more useful than the feeble regime 
that formerly existed in the United States. 
D. Financial Reporting 
Perhaps the most radical advance over prior law required by Com-
munity directives is the coordination of requirements for financial re-
porting.127 The directives not only require reports, but specify the 
form and content of financial statements. 
The Community reporting requirements appear to be significantly 
less stringent than those imposed by U.S. securities laws and regula-
tions on firms that fall within their regime, but significantly more 
stringent than those imposed on other companies by U.S. state corpo-
ration acts. Firms that fall within the federal securities acts' regime 
must report not only annually, but also quarterly and on additional 
occasions when significant events occur.128 Their reports are categori-
cally subject to the SEC's Regulation S-X, and impliedly to the stan-
dards promulgated by the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(F ASB).129 These rules and standards are more detailed and stringent 
than the fourth directive. 
Although the directive's rules are less elaborate than those of U.S. 
securities regulation, they extend to. a broader range of companies.130 
The fourth directive's requirements apply not only to public compa-
nies, but also to private companies, which in the United States are 
subject only to the vague requirements of state corporation acts.131 
Although the directive distinguishes between the requirements for 
larger and smaller companies, 132 the two regimes differ only in degrees 
of detail required.133 
Even the abridged statements require detail that is substantial in 
comparison with reporting requirements of nonpublic companies in 
127. Financial statements were initially required in 1968 by First Directive, supra note 12, 
art. 2(f), but the content of the statements was first specified in 1978 for unitary companies by the 
Fourth Directive, supra note 12, and in 1983 for affiliated groups by the Seventh Directive, supra 
note 12. 
128. See Rules 13a-1, 13a-11, and 13a-13 under the Exchange Act, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13a-1, 
240.13a-ll, and 240.13a-13 (1990). 
129. See 2 L. Loss & J. SELIGMAN, supra note 44, at 697-715; L. Loss, supra note 2, at 159-
65. 
130. Fourth Directive, supra note 12, art. l; Seventh Directive, supra note 12, art. 4. 
131. See, for example, MBCA, supra note 35, § 16.20(b), requiring only a statement of 
whether the financial statements were or were not prepared on the basis of generally accepted 
accounting principles. 
132. See supra note 93. 
133. See Fourth Directive, supra note 12, art. 27, allowing the consolidation of particular 
items, and Seventh Directive, supra note 12, art. 6, excusing smaller companies from consolida-
tion of accounts of affiliates. 
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the United States. An abridged income statement, for example, must 
report relevant data under seventeen captions, starting with gross 
profit on sales and running through staff costs (separating social secur-
ity and pensions), value adjustments (separating current and fixed as-
sets), other operating expenses, income from major investments in 
other companies (separating affiliated companies), other investment 
income, interest income, adjustments of value of financial assets, inter-
est expense, income taxes, after-tax profit or loss on ordinary opera-
tions, extraordinary income, extraordinary expense, extraordinary 
profit or loss, taxes on extraordinary profit or loss, other taxes, and 
total profit or loss. 134 
The same demarcation that separates full-dress from abridged ac-
counting separates companies that must have their annual accounts 
audited, and those that may be excused.135 If the law of a member 
state excuses some companies from auditing, it must provide "appro-
priate sanctions" for failure to comply with the directive's accounting 
standards.136 
In contrast, the Model Business Corporation Act requires only 
that a company maintain "appropriate accounting records,"137 which 
include a balance sheet, an income statement, and a statement of 
changes in equity, which the company must send to its sharehold-
ers.138 There is no requirement that the reports be audited by anyone, 
professional or otherwise. If the company prepares more elaborate 
statements, it must send them to its shareholders, 139 but there is no 
requirement that it prepare them. 
The practical difference between financial disclosure requirements 
in the Communities and in the United States is less than this compari-
son suggests, because large publicly held American corporations com-
monly fall under the provisions of federal securities acts, which require 
financial statements conforming to SEC rules.140 For smaller Ameri-
can companies, which often escape the requirements of the SEC, the 
financial reporting requirements may be substantially lighter than 
134. Fourth Directive, supra note 12, art. 23, as modified by art. 27(a). A full-dress income 
statement would differ only in breaking down "gross profit on sales" into net revenues, increase 
or decrease inventories of finished and unfinished goods, capitalized expenditures, other operat-
ing income, materials consumed, and other external charges. Id. art. 23. 
135. Id. art. 51. 
136. Id. art. 51(3). 
137. MBCA, supra note 35, § 16.0l(b). 
138. Id. § 16.20(a). 
139. Id. § 16.20(a)-(b). 
140. E.g., Rule 13a-1 under the Securities Exchange Act, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a·l (1990). 
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those of corresponding European companies.141 
The scope of the audit required by the directives is limited to the 
accuracy of the figUres presented.142 There is no hint of requirements 
like those of the French corporation law, which requires auditors to 
ascertain whether shareholders have been treated equally, 143 and to 
report to a public prosecutor any infractions of law that come to their 
attention.144 These and other requirements of national laws will pre-
sumably remain untouched by the directive, which sets minimum, not 
maximum, standards.145 
A novel peculiarity of the fourth directive is its specification of not 
only the content of financial statements, but also of the form of presen-
tation or "layout." It offers two alternative layouts of balance 
sheets146 and four alternative layouts of income statements,147 
designed to accommodate national differences. The fourth directive 
also includes a variety of accounting standards, including rules on val-
uation.148 It is supplemented by the seventh directive on consolidated 
accounts of affiliated enterprises, 149 and the eighth directive on the 
qualifications of auditors, 150 who must audit the required financial 
141. American corporations that escape the federal reporting regime may fall under a state 
securities regime because of the issuance of securities, and may prepare audited financials to 
satisfy lenders or others. If they prepare such reports for any purpose, they must, under the 
MBCA, supra note 35, § 16.20, file and distribute to shareholders reports on the same basis. But 
many closely held American companies can escape from the accounting standards and auditing 
requirements. 
142. ''The person or persons responsible for auditing the accounts must also verify that the 
annual report is consistent with the annual accounts for the same fiscal year." Fourth Directive, 
supra note 12, art. 5l(l)(b). 
143. Law No. 66-537 of July 24, 1966, art. 228, para. 4, reprinted in FRENCH LAW ON CoM-
MERClAL CoMPANIES 111 (CCH trans. 1971) [hereinafter Fr. LLC]. 
144. Id. art. 233, para. 2, at 113. This is in addition to the duty to report irregularities to the 
managing and supervisory boards, id. art. 230, para. 3, at 112, and to the meeting of sharehold-
ers. Id. art. 233, para. 1, at 113. 
145. See Fourth Directive, supra note 12, preamble. 
146. One of the balance sheet layouts follows the traditional U.S. pattern, in which all assets 
are shown in one column, and all liabilities plus equities in the other, both columns ending with 
the same total. Id. art. 9. The other layout is a one-column presentation, which starts with 
assets, then deducts current liabilities to arrive at "assets less current liabilities," then deducts 
other liabilities to conclude with capital and reserves. Id. art. 10. 
147. Two of the income statement layouts are essentially similar to the one-column form that 
is usual in the United States; they start with revenues, deduct expenses, and end with net profit. 
Id. arts. 23, 25, at 19-21. These two layouts differ from each other chiefly in the extent to which 
they separate labor and material costs from other costs of sales. The other two profit-and-loss 
layouts are two-column presentations, in which one column contains all expenditures and the 
other contains all income, and each column ends with net profit or loss. Id. arts. 24, 26. Again, 
the principal difference is in the breakdown of costs of sales. 
148. Id. arts. 31-40. 
149. Seventh Directive, supra note 12. 
150. Eighth Directive, supra note 12. 
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statements.151 
All companies, large or small, must file their financial reports in 
the national register at least annually, 152 and the register must furnish 
copies to anyone on payment of the cost of duplication.153 Large com-
panies must also publish their financial reports in an official gazette.154 
A comparison of the Community accounting requirements with 
those of the United States suggests that much more explicit require-
ments for the preparation and filing of financial statements by the cor-
porations that escape the grip of the Exchange Act would be feasible 
in the United States. If small European companies can conform, 
surely small American companies could do likewise. 
Market-oriented theorists contend that legal accounting require-
ments are superfluous because the people who deal with corporations 
can demand as much information as is useful to them, as banks are 
said to do. But most suppliers, customers, and employees are con-
fronted with problems of collective action. If they could act together, 
it would be worth their effort to demand accounting, but the demand 
is not worth its cost to any one acting separately. Obtaining legislation 
may be the most efficient means of acting together. Even banks, which 
are commonly said to have the ability to demand whatever financial 
statements they need, would find it easier to obtain useful data they 
need if companies were already required to prepare and file standard-
ized financial reports. 
E. Mergers and Split-ups 
By 1991, a third directive on intrastate mergers155 and a sixth di-
rective on intrastate split-ups (called "divisions"156) had been adopted, 
and a tenth directive on "cross-border'' mergers157 had been proposed. 
These directives related only to public companies. 
The functions of the merger and split-up directives were not only 
to provide safeguards, but also to assure that member states would 
authorize simple procedures for combining and dividing enterprises. 
These procedures were much slower to develop in European countries 
151. Id. art. 2. 
152. First Directive, supra note 12, art. 3. 
153. Id. art. 3(3), at 10; Fourth Directive, supra note 12, art. 47(1). 
154. First Directive, supra note 12, art. 3(4), purports to require publication by all compa-
nies, but Fourth Directive, supra note 12, art. 47(2), allows states to exempt small companies 
from publication. 
155. Third Directive, supra note 12. 
156. Sixth Directive, supra note 12. 
157. Tenth Directive 1985, supra note 13. 
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than they had been in the United States.158 The directives ordered 
member states to provide for mergers and split-ups by decisions of 
corporations' governing boards, confirmed by shareholders' votes or 
acquiescence.159 
The proposed directive on cross-border mergers would require 
states to allow their corporations to merge with those of other states, 
thereby relinquishing their prior nationality. Combined with the liber-
ation of intrastate mergers, the directive would open the door to great 
freedom in the restructuring of enterprises in the Common Market. 
The safeguards imposed on intrastate mergers and proposed for 
cross-border mergers are milder in some respects than those in Ameri-
can corporation acts. Where shareholders' approval is required, for 
example, the required majority is measured against the shares repre-
sented at the meeting, 160 rather than against the shares entitled to vote, 
as in most U.S. corporations acts. 161 The vote of shareholders may be 
dispensed with if the proposal has been duly announced, and has not 
been opposed by five percent or more of the shareholders.162 This is a 
more generous dispensation than those found in most U.S. corporation 
acts, which allow bypassing the shareholders only when the economic 
impact on shareholders is slight.163 
The disclosures required to accompany a merger are also trivial in 
comparison with those imposed by federal securities regulations on 
mergers of companies registered under the Exchange Act.164 The spe-
cific provisions for informing shareholders are also minimal when 
compared with those of U.S. corporation laws. The merger proposal 
does not need to be mailed to shareholders - as U.S. acts require even 
with respect to shareholders who cannot vote on it165 - but only filed 
158. See Conard, Corporate Fusion in the Common Market, 14 AM. J. CoMP. L. 573 (1966). 
159. Third Directive, supra note 12, arts. 5, 7, 8; Sixth Directive, supra note 12, arts. 3, 5, 6; 
Tenth Directive 1985, supra note 13, arts. 5, 7. The tenth directive omits the authorization of 
shareholder approval by acquiescence. 
160. Third Directive, supra note 12, art. 7. The member state's corporation law may require 
either a majority of two thirds of the shares represented, or a simple majority when half of the 
outstanding shares are represented. Each class of shares must approve separately. 
161. E.g., MBCA, supra note 35, § 11.03(e); DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 8, § 25l(c) (Supp. 1990). 
162. Third Directive, supra note 12, art. 8. 
163. The MBCA dispenses with shareholder votes when (1) shareholders' rights are un-
changed, and the number of shares is increased by no more than 20%, MBCA, supra note 35, 
§ 1103(g), or (2) a merger partner holds 90% of the corporation's shares. Id. § 11.04. The 
Delaware General Corporation Law, DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 251(t), 253 (Supp. 1990) are 
similar. 
164. See Item 14 in Schedule 14A under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.14a-101 (1990). 
165. MBCA, supra note 35, § ll.03(d); DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 8, § 25l(c) (Supp. 1990). 
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and published.166 
The permissiveness of the directives in regard to shareholder infor-
mation and approval is probably based less on indifference to share-
holder interests than on the difficulty of communicating with holders 
of bearer shares, which are common in European companies. Compa-
nies cannot communicate directly with shareholders whose names 
they do not know. If the Communities were determined to require 
effective communication with individual shareholders, they would 
have to change the company laws to require that shares be registered 
in the names of owners. Although this would facilitate the protection 
of shareholders as voters, it would collide with the traditional passion 
of European investors for anonymity. This passion seems to derive 
partly from a desire to be protected from solicitors, thieves, kidnap-
pers, tax collectors, and from hostile governments in cases of war, 
revolution, or pogrom. 
Notwithstanding the lack of communication with individual share-
holders, the interests of shareholders are likely to be well protected in 
practice. A substantial proportion of shares in European companies 
are owned or represented by banks, which do not overlook the pub-
lished notices of proposed corporate actions, and are very ready to 
vote in defense of their own interests and those of the other sharehold-
ers whom they represent.167 If there is a lesson to be learned from the 
comparison of European and American shareholder representation, it 
is not that Europeans should ape the American charade of informing 
individual shareholders, but that Americans should promote the Euro-
pean practice of active participation by institutional investors. 
Besides protecting shareholders, the merger directives provide pos-
itive protection to creditors and employees. Creditors who are ad-
versely affected by mergers can demand "adequate safeguards."168 
Bondholding creditors, however, may be bound by a majority vote ap-
proving a merger.169 
Employees derive some protection from a separate directive,170 to 
166. Third Directive, supra note 12, art. 6, making cross-reference to First Directive, supra 
note 12, art. 3. 
167. See R. BUXBAUM & K. HOPI', supra note 17, at 192; Grossfeld, Management and Con-
trol of Marketable Share Companies, in 13 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OP CoMPARATIVE 
LAW, supra note 43, §§ 4-241 to -243. 
168. Third Directive, supra note 12, art. 13. Neither the directive nor its commentary indi-
cates what kinds of safeguards are contemplated. One obvious possibility is to require the merger 
partner to reduce its debt by exchanging bonds for shares before the merger is completed. 
169. Id. art. 14. 
170 .. Council Directive 77/187, 20 O.J. EuR. CoMM. (No. L 61) 26 (1977). This is one of 
another series of directives on employee rights issued pursuant to Article 100 of the Treaty au-
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which the intrastate merger directive makes cross-reference.171 This 
order specifies that transferees of business enterprises, or parts of 
them, are subject to the same employment duties as their transfer-
ors.172 It also requires that transferors notify employees of intended 
transfers, the reasons for them, and their probable consequences.173 
The notice must be given "in good time," which is not further defined 
in the directive. The Community officers presumably expect state 
lawmakers to add specificity to the "good time" requirement, in ac-
cordance with the Treaty's rule that a directive "shall leave to the na-
tional authorities the choice of form and methods."174 
The directives on split-ups175 and on cross-border mergers176 are 
essentially similar to the merger directive in regard to rights of share-
holders and creditors. They do not deal expressly with rights of 
employees. 
F. One-Member Companies 
The directive on companies with a sole shareholder177 is not so 
much a safeguard as a liberation from the conception of a corporation, 
derived from Roman law, as an association of two or more individu-
als.178 The idea is inherent in the very words by which Europeans 
designate corporations - societi, societd, and sociedad (etymologically 
cognate to "society"), Gesellschaft (etymologically parallel to "fellow-
ship"), and even the English "company" (etymologically related to 
"companionship"). It was formalized in the Code Napoleon, which 
defined a societe as a form of contract, 179 which logically requires plu-
rality. It was sometimes invoked to contend that acts of a one-mem-
ber corporation were null, or that a sole shareholder must be 
individually liable for all the corporation's obligations.180 
These applications of the theory impeded modem ways of doing 
thorizing directives of unspecified content that "affect the establishment or functioning of the 
common market." Treaty, supra note 2, art. 100, at 255. 
171. Third Directive, supra note 12, art. 12. 
172. Council Directive, supra note 170, art 3, at 27. 
173. Id. art. 6, at 27. 
174. Treaty, supra note 2, art. 189(3), at 305. 
175. Sixth Directive, supra note 12. 
176. Tenth Directive 1985, supra note 13. 
177. Twelfth Directive, supra note 12. 
178. See Baugniet, La sociiti d'une personne, in RAPPORTS BELGES AU VIIE CoNGREs IN-
TERNATIONAL DE DROIT CoMPARE 169 (1966). 
179. See Code Civil [C. C1v] art. 1832 (Fr.). It was amended in 1985 to allow formation by a 
single person. Loi no. 85-697 du 11 juillet 1985, art. 1, 117 J.O. 7862 (1985). 
180. Baugniet, supra note 178, at 171. 
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business, especially across state borders, through wholly owned sub-
sidiaries. The directive simply abolishes the theory, by recognizing 
that a corporation can be formed by a single member181 and may con-
tract with its member, 182 who may perform singlehandedly the statu-
tory functions of a shareholders' meeting.183 From an American 
viewpoint, this directive may be viewed as a sensible, though belated, 
acceptance of the position that has long prevailed in U.S. law.184 
G. Governance 
1. The Fifth Directive 
By far the most significant area of coordination, and the most con-
tested, is that of governance. Who makes decisions for the corpora-
tion, and who chooses the deciders? These are the same subjects that 
have engendered a river of literature inspired by Berle and Means' The 
Modem Corporation and Private Property, 185 recapitulated by Her-
man's Corporate Control, Corporate Power, 186 and sustained by pro-
longed debates in the American Law Institute. 
The Commission proposed to deal with this subject in a document 
issued in 1972 and designated "fifth directive." Although a sixth, a 
seventh, an eighth, an eleventh, and a twelfth directive were proposed 
and adopted while the fifth was debated and revised, the governance 
directive continues to be known as the "fifth." Like the directives on 
capital and on merger, it is directed only to public companies. 
The leitmotif of the directive is the control of corporate managers. 
In one of its aspects, it seeks to reinforce the same interest that has 
always motivated corporation laws, the interest of shareholders. In 
another aspect, it gives new recognition to an interest that was previ-
ously unmentioned in most corporation laws, the interest of employ-
ees. Notably absent is any effort to recognize the interests of the other 
corporate constituencies, such as suppliers, customers, communities, 
and the national economy, which have emerged as desiderata in U.S. 
corporation law amendments of the 198Qs.187 
181. Twelfth Directive, supra note 12, art. 2, at 41. 
182. Id. art. S, at 41. 
183. Id. art. 4, at 41. 
184. See H. BALLANTINE, BALLANTINE ON CoRPORATIONS 295-96 (rev. ed. 1946). 
185. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 
(1933). 
186. E. HERMAN, CoRPORATE CoNTROL, CoRPORATE POWER (1981). 
187. See Symposium, Corporate Malaise - Stakeholders Statutes: Cause or Cure? 21 STET· 
SON L. REv. 1 (1991); Symposium, Defining the Corporate Constituency, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 319 
(1990); Committee on Corporate Laws, Other Constituency Statutes: Potential/or Confusion, 45 
Bus. LAW. 2253 (forthcoming 1990). 
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The directive seeks to achieve its objectives through four main de-
vices: (1) requiring independent supervision of management, (2) giv-
ing employees a voice in the selection of supervisors, (3) reinforcing 
the powers of shareholders, and (4) requiring an independent audit of 
corporate reports. 
Although the first draft of the fifth directive was published in 1972, 
and a second in 1983, a final directive had not been issued by mid-
1991, and agreement on it did not seem imminent. The liveliest pros-
pect of implementation of its concepts was the likelihood that the 
Council would adopt an SE ("European Company") statute that 
would embody most of the same principles. But the choice of any 
company to bring itself under the SE statute would be entirely volun-
tary, and was expected to be embraced by no more than a handful of 
multinational enterprises. When, if ever, the directive's reforms would 
become binding on member states remained speculative. 
2. Independent Supervision 188 
The first draft of the fifth directive would have imposed a single 
formula for the independent supervision of management. Every public 
company would have a supervisory council (called the "supervisory 
organ" in the English version of the draft) of which managers could 
not be members, which would hire and fire the managers.189 Active 
management would be carried on by a subordinate manager or board 
of managers (called the "management organ"). This structure was a 
virtual reproduction of that prescribed for public companies by Ger-
man law,190 which had prevailed in its essentiaJs since 1884.191 France 
had authorized a similar structure as an option for public companies in 
1967,192 but it was an innovation that French commentators regarded 
as a German import.193 
This assault on national folkways awakened expectable resistance 
in member states, which intensified when Great Britain became a 
188. For a fuller discussion of this subject, see Conard, The Supervision of Corporate 
Management: A Comparison of Developments in European Community and United States Law, 
82 MICH. L. REV. 1459 (1984). 
189. Fifth Directive 1983, supra note 13, arts. 3(1), 13(1), 6. 
190. Ger. SCL, supra note 51, §§ 84(1), 84(3), 105(1). The supervisory council was known in 
German as the Auftichtsrat (etymologically "oversight council"), and the manager or manage-
ment board as the Vorstand (etymologically "standing in front"). 
191. See W. GADOw, E. HEINICHEN, E. ScHMIDT, W. ScHMIDT & 0. WElPPERT, AK-
TlENGESETZ KOMMENTAR ix-xii (1939). 
192. Fr. LLC, supra note 143, arts. 118-50, at 72-82. The French name for the supervisory 
council is conseil de surveillance, and for the management, directoire. 
193. 1 J. HEMARI>, F. TER.RE & P. MABILAT, Socmrts CoMMERCIALES 926-30 (1972). 
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member state in 1973. In 1983, the second draft of the directive194 
offered states a free choice between a "two-tier system"195 on the Ger-
man pattern and a "one-tier system"196 on the pattern that had pre-
vailed in other states, and which is similar to that of the U.S. "board of 
directors." 
The one-tier option differed from the provisions of U.S. corpora-
tion laws in requiring that the nonmanagement members of the board 
must constitute a majority.197 But this difference was more formal 
than real, since a majority of U.S. public corporations have adopted 
nonmanagement majorities in order to validate transactions involving 
management compensation and other managerial conflicts of inter-
est.198 In one respect, U.S. case law seems to be even more productive 
of directorial independence than the directive, since it tends to disqual-
ify from the "disinterested" category directors with family or financial 
ties to management. 199 The directive, by contrast, seems to require 
nothing beyond the directors' not holding executive positions. 
In placing reliance on the prevalence of nonexecutives in the gov-
erning organs, the Community experts were probably inspired by the 
German experience, in which banks participate actively as sharehold-
ers or as shareholders' custodians in the election of supervisory board 
members. 200 German banks sometimes choose officers of corporate 
customers or suppliers who would not pass the American test of "dis-
interest."201 But the councillors that the banks select are more likely 
to act independently of management than councillors chosen by the 
managers themselves. 
In other countries, where banks or other financial institutions do 
not effectively choose the council or management board members, the 
directive seems to present no obstacle to managers using proxy power 
to coopt as board members individuals who are bound to the managers 
by personal relationship or by economic dependence. 
194. Fifth Directive 1983, supra note 13. 
195. Id. arts. 3-21. 
196. Id. arts. 2la-2lu. 
197. Id. art. 2la(l)(a). 
198. See DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (1990); MBCA, supra note 35, § 862. 
199. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CoRPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALY• 
SIS AND REcoMMENDATIONs § 3A.Ol (Tent. Draft No. 11, 1991) (defining "significant relation-
ship" to include family connections with executives, recent employment by the corporation, and 
current business relations with the corporation). 
200. See Grossfeld, supra note 167, at 98; R. BUXBAUM & K. HoPT, supra note 17, at 179. 
201. See c. VOGEL, AKTIENRECHT UND Ax.TIENWIRKLICHKEIT - ORGANISATION UND 
AUFGABENTEILUNG VON VORSTAND UND AUFSICHTSRAT 120-28 (1980). 
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3. The Voice of Employees 
H the fifth directive was radical in its proposal for supervision of 
management, it was revolutionary in its proposals for the voice of em-
ployees in corporate governance. These proposals applied, however, 
only to companies that employ five hundred or more individuals. 
Under the 1972 draft, corporations would have had to give em-
ployees a voice in the selection of members of the supervisory council 
(which every public company, under this draft, was required to have), 
in one of two ways. One method, patterned after German law,202 re-
quired the election of at least one third of the council members by 
employees.203 The other method, patterned on Netherlands law, 
called for cooptation of new supervisory council members by the in-
cumbent members, but gave to employee representatives the right to 
1 object to any appointment on the ground that the appointment would 
cause an "imbalance" in regard to the "interests of the company, the 
shareholders or the workers."204 These provisions awakened opposi-
tion not only from managers and shareholders, but also from labor 
leaders, especially British labor leaders, who saw the design as a de-
tour around the power of union officers. 205 
The 1983 draft added two new options to the means of represent-
ing employees. Under one of the new options, the employees could be 
given, instead of the right to appoint or to veto appointments of coun-
cillors, the right io have a representative body that would be regularly 
informed about company affairs, and consulted on major changes, 
plant closings, and substantial cutbacks.206 Under the other option, 
employee interests could be protected by any arrangement that was 
agreed on through collective bargaining and that required informing 
employee representatives about company affairs, and consulting them 
on major changes.207 A parallel set of options was offered for compa-
202. See Ger. SCL. supra note 51, § 96, which refers to other codetermination statutes relat-
ing to different kinds of companies. For most public companies, the relevant law was the Law on 
Employee Codetermination (Gesetz iiber die Mitbestimmung der Arbeitnehmer) of May 4, 1976, 
BGBI. I, 1153. For a comparison of German codetermination with U.S. labor relations, see 
Sharp, Codetermination: A Postmortem, 40 LAB. L.J. 323 (1989); Summers, supra note 50. 
203. Fifth Directive 1972, supra note 52, art. 4(2), at 51. 
204. Lang, The Fifth EEC Directive on the Harmonization of Company Law (pt 2), 12 CoM-
MON Mlcr. L. REV. 345, 349-50 (1975); Fifth Directive 1983, supra note 13, art. 4c. 
205. See Kolvenbach, EEC Company Law Harmonization and Worker Participation, 11 U. 
PA. J. INTL. Bus. L. 709, 725-26 (1990); Clough, Trying to Make the Fifth Directive Palatable, 3 
CoMPANY L. 109, 115 (1982); Conlon, Industrial Democracy and EEC Company Law: A Review 
of the Draft Fifth Directive, 24 INTL. & CoMP. L.Q. 348 (1975); Lang, supra note 204, at 163-66, 
345, 349-50. Cf. Hadden, Employee Participation - What Future for the German Model?, 3 
CoMPANY L. 250, 257 (1982) (suggesting that labor leaders should welcome the German model). 
206. Fifth Directive 1983, supra note 13, arts. 4, 12. 
207. Id. arts. 4e, 12. 
2186 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 89:2150 
nies with one-tier systems of govemance.2os 
4. The Loyalty of Managers and Supervisors 
The proposal to place representatives of both shareholders and em-
ployees on the governing council or board gave rise to a conceptual 
puzzle about the nature of the fiduciary duties that would be owed by 
these representatives of dissimilar constituencies. Were delegates of 
each class bound to advance the interests of their own class, and to 
oppose the interests of the other class when interests clashed? 
Although German law had provided for employees to elect council 
members since 1950, it had never addressed the possible conflict of the 
duties of the two classes of members. 209 
The United Kingdom adopted in 1980 an express formulation of a 
directorial obligation to both shareholders and employees in these 
terms: "The matters to which the directors of a company are to have 
regard in the performance of their functions shall include the interests 
of the company's employees in general as well as the interests of its 
members."210 But this provision was directed only to representatives 
of shareholders, since British law made no provision for representation 
of employees. 
The second draft of the fifth directive proposed answers to the 
question of conflicting loyalties in these two clauses: 
All members of the management and supervisory organs shall have 
the same rights and duties . . . . 211 
All the members of the management and supervisory organs shall 
carry out their functions in the interest of the company, having regard to 
the interests of the shareholders and employees.212 
208. Id. art. 21. However, the system of appointment and veto was not extended to one-tier 
systems, presumably because appointment by a board that included executives would be less 
likely to lead to choice of independent board members. 
209. See Grossmann, Untemehmensziele im Aktienrecht, 29 ABHANDLUNOBN ZUM DBUT· 
SCHBN UND BUROPAiscHBN IIANDBLS- UND WJRTSCHAFTSRECIIT l (1980). A clause of the 
1937 Stock Corporation Law had called on the managers (not the supervisors) to manage the 
business as required by the welfare of the enterprise and its personnel, and for the common good 
of the people and the state (wie das Wohl des Betriebs und seiner Gefolgschaft und der gemeine 
Nutzen von Volk und Reich esfordem). AktG 1937, supra note 51, § 70(1). This provision was 
omitted from the 1965 revision of the Stock Corporation Law, which provided that the manage-
ment board should manage the business "as a matter of its own responsibility," without specify-
ing for what ends. Ger. SCL, supra note 51, § 76(1). 
210. Companies Act 1980, § 46(1), reenacted as Companies Act 1985, § 309(1). 
211. Fifth Directive 1983, supra note 13, art. lO(a)(l). A provision with similar effect, 
adapted to one-tier structures, appeared in article 21q(l). The elided words allowed the delega-
tion of particular duties to particular members, as an exception to the rule of identical duties. 
212. Id. art. 10(a)(2). A provision with similar effect for one-tier structure appeared in art. 
21q(2), at 22. 
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5. The Powers of Shareholders 
The directive's provisions on the powers of shareholders were not 
very different from those found in U.S. corporations laws. Sharehold-
ers must be notified of meetings and of agendas. There were no provi-
sions comparable to those of the U.S. proxy rules requiring the 
company to inform shareholders about the compensation of officers 
and directors and the qualifications of directorial candidates. There 
was no suggestion of a shareholder's right to present proposals at com-
pany expense. 
One example of a provision that might be regarded as protecting 
shareholders' voting rights better than U.S. laws do is the prescription 
that "[t]he shareholder's right to vote shall be proportionate to the 
fraction of the subscribed capital which the shares represent."213 This 
command is subject to an exception for "shares which carry special 
advantages," which in European parlance usually denote shares that 
Americans would call "preferred." In practice, the prescription 
means that common shares have voting rights based on their par val-
ues, which generally correspond in Europe to their initial public offer-
ing prices. Translated to the United States, it would exclude 
nonvoting common shares in public corporations. 
H. Takeovers 
The latest directive to be proposed - designated the "thir-
teenth,''214 deals with takeovers through share purchase, whether 
"friendly" or "hostile." The directive would not only regulate take-
over procedures, but would also require eacp state to designate a "su-
pervisory authority" to oversee takeover procedures. 215 
The triggering event for the major incidents of the directive is not 
the actual acquisition of a specified proportion of the shares of a target 
company, as under the U.S. Exchange Act,216 but aiming to acquire a 
specified proportion.217 The percentage of shares that triggers the 
213. Id. art. 33(1). 
214. Thirteenth Directive 1990, supra note 13. 
215. Id. art. 6. 
216. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 13(d)(l), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(l) (1988). 
217. Thirteenth Directive 1990, supra note 13, art. 4(1): 
Any person aiming to acquire a number or percentage of securities, which, added to any 
existing holdings, gives him a percentage of the voting rights in a company which may not 
be fixed at more than 33 1/3% shall be obliged to make a bid to acquire all the securities of 
that company. 
The preamble of the directive and the official explanatory memorandum, BULL. E.C. SUPP., 
Mar. 1989, at 8, explain the requirement as applying to anyone "wishing to acquire" shares. 
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duty may be set by each member state at a level as high as 33 1;3,21s 
which is a far cry from the five percent of the U.S. regulation.219 
When this threshold is reached, the acquirer must not only disclose its 
identity and purpose, 220 but must make a general tender offer for one 
hundred percent of the shares of the company.221 
The directive contains a number of other features, some of which 
are reminiscent of U.S. tender offer rules, designed to give sharehold-
ers a fair chance to exercise their rights. For example, the tender offer 
must last four weeks, with an added week for each change in its terms, 
and if it raises its offer, must make the higher price available to earlier 
acceptors. 222 
When compared with federal regulation of takeover bids in the 
United States, the most conspicuous distinction of the proposed direc-
tive is its brevity. A more basic distinction, however, seems to be its 
restriction of defensive activities of takeover targets, subjecting them 
to governmental supervision. From the moment that it receives notice 
of the tender offer, the target company must refrain from defensive 
measures unless it receives permission from the state's supervisory au-
thority. 223 Ultimately, however, the state agencies to which supervi-
sion is entrusted may prove to be as protective of target managements 
as state legislatures have been in the United States. 
Although the thirteenth directive seems likely to provoke lively de-
bate, published discussions since issuance of the proposal furnish no 
substantial bases for evaluating it. ,.,, 
V. THE SUCCESS OF CoORDINATION (FROM A EUROPEAN 
VIEWPOINT) 
A. A Market Economist's View 
If Europeans viewed their coordination program from the view-
point of an American "market economist," they would probably re-
gard most of its provisions as misguided interventions in state 
autonomy. If each member state were left free to make its own choice 
of safeguards, they would think, efficiency-seeking managers would 
move their enterprises to the states with the most efficient safeguards, 
218. Thirteenth Directive 1990, supra note 13, art. 4(1). 
219. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 13(d)(l), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(dX1) (1988). 
220. Thirteenth Directive 1990, supra note 13, art. 10. 
221. Id. art. 4(1). 
222. Id. arts. 12 (duration), 15 (raised bid); cf. Exchange Act Rule 14e-l(a), 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.14e-l(a) (1990) (on duration of tender offers); Exchange Act § 14(d)(7), 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78n(dX7) (1988) (on raised bids). 
223. Thirteenth Directive 1990, supra note 13, art. 8. 
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thereby maximizing the productivity of European business. 224 
These economists might see some slight merit in the provisions of 
the first directive that require enterprises in all member states to iden-
tify themselves in a uniform way; bettors can bet better when they 
know the names and the stables of the horses. But these critics could 
be expected to regret the adoption of most other provisions on the 
ground that competition among states would have produced more effi-
cient requirements of financial disclosure and auditing than a Commu-
nity bureaucracy is likely to produce. The program's greatest success, 
from this viewpoint, might be the nonadoption of directives five and 
thirteen. This appraisal of coordination is, however, uninteresting to 
most Europeans, who do not share the views of American market 
economists on the proper role of legislation. 
B. An Institutional Economist's View 
Although "market economists" are prone to assume that their 
views are the only true economics,225 another school of economics, 
with an older pedigree, favors signillcant degrees of regulation of busi-
ness,226 although its advocates in current legal literature are more 
often called "institutionalists" than "economists." They advocate uni-
form minimum standards in corporation law, and generally favor 
some form of federal intervention in order to impose them. 221 
The policymakers of the Communities are clearly institutionalists 
in this sense. Although they favor a free market in goods and services, 
they do not favor a free market in legislation. Even the British, who 
are most reluctant to let employees elect members of governing 
boards, do not seem to oppose rigorous regulation in other matters, 
such as financial reporting.228 It is from this perspective that I will 
224. See Fischel, supra note 6; cf. Lorie, An Economist's Perception I: A View on the Need to 
Revise Corporation Statutes, in CoMMENTARIES ON CoRPORATE STRUCTIJRE AND GoVERN-
ANCE 51 (D. Schwartz ed. 1979); Scott, Corporation Law and the American Law Institute Corpo-
rate Governance Project, 35 STAN. L. REV. 927, 929-31, 947-48 (1983). 
225. See Fischel, supra note 6, at 917-18; Scott, supra note 224, at 929-31. For a ringing 
affirmation of faith in market economics, see Kitch, The Fire of Truth: A Remembrance of Law 
and Economics at Chicago, 1932-70, 26 J.L. & EcoN. 163 (1983). 
226. See Hovenkamp, The First Great Law & Economics Movement, 42 STAN. L. REV. 993 
(1990). 
227. See Cary, supra note 5; Schwartz, Federal Chartering of Corporations: An Introduction, 
61 GEO. LJ. 71 (1972); Jennings, Federalization of Corporation Law: Part Way or All the Way, 
31 Bus. LAW. 991 (1976). 
228. See Clough, supra note 205; Coleman, supra note 24; Conlon, supra note 205; Hadden, 
supra note 205; Lang, supra note 204, at 345; Turner, The Fifth Company Law Directive - A 
Saga of the Lawyer in the First Elected European Parliament, 3 Bus. L. REV. 215 (1982); Tyrrell, 
Employee Participation in the Decision Making of Public Limited Companies: The 5th Directive 
Options, 132 NEW LJ. 35 (1982). 
A lonely European voice favoring diversity of company laws on the American model was 
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examine the success of the Communities' program of coordination. 
At this writing, in mid-1991, the process of coordinating company 
laws is obviously unfinished. Two important directives are hanging 
fire, and one can imagine demands for additional directives.229 One 
must therefore consider separately how successful the coordination is 
in its present state of incompletion, and how successful it is likely to be 
if pending directives are enacted. 
The success of coordination has major implications not only for 
corporations, but also for the progress of the Communities toward 
economic unity. For example, the agreement of Germany and France 
to open their markets to other countries was coupled with an assur-
ance that "equivalent safeguards" would be required in the corpora-
tion laws of other members. 
If markets are opened without safeguards that leaders of member 
states consider essential, states may have the same kinds of objections 
to a common market in Europe that laborers in the United States have 
to a common market in North America. Although member states 
cannot afford to withdraw now from the market, they can express 
their frustration by resisting other phases of European integration, like 
the establishment of fixed exchange rates and of a common currency. 
C. Gauges of Success 
In order to gauge the success of coordination in either its present 
or its future stages, one must identify the objectives against which suc-
cess should be measured. Since the Treaty did not articulate the objec-
tives to be attained by the "equivalent safeguards," I will postulate a 
raised by H. KREKELER, WIRTSCHAFI'LICHE INTEGRATION UND GESELLSCHAFl'SRECIIT: 
AMERIKANISCHE ERFAHRUNGBN UND EUROPAiscHE IRRWEGB 158-63 (1973) (Economic Inte-
gration and Company Law: American Experience and European Wrong Turns). 
229. For one example, the liability of controlling persons for obligations of subsidiaries hns 
yet to be coordinated. It is addressed in radically different ways by the German Stock Corpora-
tion Law, supra note 51, §§ 321-323 and by the French Insolvency Law (Loi no. 67-563 du 13 
juillet 1967, arts. 106, 108, 163 J.O. 7059, 7066 (1967). See Hofstetter, Parent Responsibility for 
Subsidiary Corporations: Evaluating European Trends, 39 INTI.. & CoMP. L.Q. 576 (1990). 
The proposed SE statute of 1970 would have made a controlling SE liable for the debts of a 
subsidiary. SE Stat. 1970, supra note 68, arts. 6, 239, at 3-4, 46. See Derom, The EEC Approach 
to Groups of Componies, 16 VA. J. INTI.. L. 565, 603 (1976). But the 1989 draft left liability of a 
controlling SE to the national law of the controlled SE's home office. SE Stat. 1989, supra note 
68, art. 114, at 63-64. 
Under the European Economic Interest Grouping, supra note 67, art. 24, at 7, members of a 
grouping are liable for the debts of the grouping, but nothing is said about liability of the group-
ing for debts of its members. 
A proposal to deal with liability of parent companies in a "ninth directive" was aired inside 
the Commission in 1985, but never emerged as a Commission proposal. Kolvenbach, supra note 
205, at 733-38. 
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few that seem likely to have been taken for granted by the Community 
founders. 
1. Disclosing Identity and Finances 
The most widely shared objective of coordination may have been 
to assure that denizens of any country who were solicited to buy from, 
sell to, or work for a company of the same or another country should 
have a ready way of determining the address of the company, the 
names of the representatives who are authorized to contract on its be-
half, and its financial status. This objective seems to be reasonably 
well served by the requirements of identification and financial 
reporting.230 · 
2. Representation of Employees 
A second objective, which animates the perennial battle over the 
fifth directive, is to assure that employees have some voice in decision-
making at the highest level of enterprise governance. This objective 
was probably most strongly cherished by Germans, who had inserted 
this requirement in their own law. It was probably not viewed as an 
objective of coordination by most of the states that became Commu-
nity members later. Great Britain, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and 
Greece had nothing in their national laws requiring employee partici-
pation in decisionmaking at any level. British opinion was the most 
vocal in opposing the rigid form of codetermination that appeared in 
the first draft of the fifth directive.231 
To many leaders of labor and of the labor-oriented Social Demo-
cratic party, "equivalent safeguards" will seem deficient so long as 
there is no Community-wide requirement of employee representation 
in corporate governance. The least happy group will probably be em-
ployees in countries like Germany and the Netherlands who now have 
a voice in their employers' councils. Although the coordination pro-
gram will not diminish the voice of these employees in their own com-
panies, they may fear that multinational enterprise will shift 
production from German and Netherlands subsidiaries to Italian and 
Spanish affiliates in order to diminish the influence of labor 
representatives. 
Even if the fifth directive is adopted in its 1983 form, it will permit 
some states to make themselves much more attractive to managers 
than Germany is. If managers can agree with union leaders on a plan 
230. See supra text accompanying notes 97-110. 
231. See authors cited supra note 205. 
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of interaction, they can satisfy the directive without giving employees 
any chance to vote for representatives, and without giving any labor 
representative a right to hear and be heard in board meetings. It may 
be further weakened before it is adopted, thereby intensifying the dis-
satisfaction of German and Netherlands workers. 
On the other hand, employees and their leaders may take comfort 
from the Community's actions to further employee interests more di-
rectly. Pursuant to Treaty articles on promoting "improved working 
conditions and an improved standard of living for workers," the 
Council adopted in the 1970s two directives on protection of workers 
in cases of layoffs and takeovers. 232 In 1990, the Commission pro-
posed a broad "Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of 
Workers. "233 
3. Independent Supervision of Management 
Another major aspiration of the Community coordinators is to re-
quire that public corporations have either a supervisory council com-
posed of nonexecutives, or a majority of nonexecutives on an 
administrative board. This demand is probably based on a European 
supposition that independent supervision protects investors from the 
incompetence or opportunism of managers. 
Pending adoption of the fifth directive, investors in corporations of 
most of the member states will have no assurance of independent su-
pervision of managers. If German investors are not wary, they will 
find themselves tied to foreign corporations that lack the independent 
supervision to which German investors are accustomed. If German 
investors are wary of investment in corporations of other member 
states, the free flow of investment will be impeded. 
Even when "independent directors" occupy commanding posi-
tions, either before or after the fifth directive becomes mandatory, in-
vestors may find that the supervision of management under the 
directive is far from independent. There is nothing in the directive to 
prevent company executives from soliciting proxies with which they 
elect themselves or friendly allies, as they ordinarily do in the United 
States. 
Community experts may be relying on the strength of shareholding 
232. Council directive 751129 on the approximation of laws of the Member States relating to 
collective redundancies, 18 OJ. EUR. CoMM. (No. L 48) 29 (1975); Council directive 771187 on 
the approximation of the laws of Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees' rights in 
the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses, or parts of businesses, 20 O.J. EUR. CoMM. (No. 
L61) 26 (1977). 
233. CoMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN CoMMUNJTIES, CoMMUNITY CHARTER OF Tim 
F'uNDAMENTAL SOCIAL RIGHTS OF WORKERS (1990). 
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banks, as observed in the German experience, to mitigate conflicts of 
interest. 234 But commentators on corporate practice in other Commu-
nity members do not mention any similar bank influence. Corporation 
managers might conceivably reduce their exposure to rigorous super-
vision by raising their capital chiefly in countries where banks are less 
powerful than they are in Germany. This phenomenon, if it arose, 
would distort the conditions of competition for capital in the 
Communities. 
With respect to producing independent supervision of managers 
where it did not exist before, the fifth directive looks somewhat like a 
paper tiger. 
4. A "Delaware of Europe"? 
If the fifth and thirteenth directives continue to gather moss, a 
gravitation of corporations from stricter to laxer states may become 
visible, defeating a primary objective of the coordination program. 
This movement would be facilitated by adoption of the proposed Rec-
ognition Treaty,235 which assures corporations of every Community 
state that they will be admitted in other Community states, while con-
tinuing to be governed Qike out-of-state corporations in the United 
States) by the laws of their states of incorporation. Pending ratifica-
tion of this treaty,236 the member states seem likely to recognize out-
of-state corporations to a degree not greatly different from that which 
the Treaty would require. 231 
The gravitation would probably not go so far as in the United 
States, where major corporations are governed by the law of Delaware 
even though they have nothing there but a file and a mailing address. 
When European corporations maintain their principal executive offices 
in another state, they may be subjected to provisions of the host state's 
laws.23s 
This principle invites comparison with the provisions of California 
and New York law that impose domestic rules on foreign corporations 
234. See Grossfeld, Management and Control of Marketable Share Companies, in 13 INTER-
NATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CoMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 43, at 98; R. BUXBAUM & K. 
Hon, supra note 17, at 179. 
235. Convention on the Mutual Recognition of Companies and Bodies Corporate of Feb. 29, 
1968, BULL E.C. SUPP. Feb. 1969, at 7 [hereinafter Recognition Treaty]. 
236. Wooldridge considered early ratification unlikely. F. WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 12, at 
135. 
237. See id. at 136-37. 
238. Id. The Recognition Treaty would limit imposition of the host state's rules to those it 
deems "essential." Recognition Treaty, supra note 235, art. 4, at 9; see also Reind1, supra note 
19, at 1274. 
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that have a majority of their activities in those states as measured by 
factors such as sales, assets, and employees. 239 But the European prin-
ciple is susceptible to easier evasion, since only the executive offices 
need to be kept out of a host state to escape the impact of legislation. 
In pre-Community Europe, the home-office test of subjection to 
host country law probably offered little temptation for evasion, since 
the executives of a French company would have felt as strange in Ger-
many as would the executives of a U.S. company in Mexico. But the 
mobility of executives seems likely to increase as the Market becomes 
more Common, and the evasion of host country corporation laws be-
comes more attractive. Luxembourg (where both French and German 
languages are official) might become a kind of European Delaware for 
companies that are prepared to set up home offices there. 
If the fifth and thirteenth directives are adopted, the force of the 
impulse to seek a haven of laxity will be diminished, but will not be 
completely extinguished. The fifth directive offers a variety of forms 
of employee representation, some of which could degenerate to empty 
charades. 240 If they do, the coordination program may not have exor-
cised the possibility of a corporate haven's blossoming within the 
Communities.241 
VI. LESSONS FOR AMERICANS 
What the European experience shows about "minimum standards" 
in the United States will be viewed quite differently by "market econo-
mists" like James Lorie and Daniel Fischel and by "institutionalists" 
like William L. Cary and Joel Seligman. 
A. A Market Economist's Lesson 
To an American "market economist," the most significant lesson 
of the Community coordination effort is the extreme difficulty of pro-
ducing consensus on minimum standards, which may be regarded as 
an indication that there are no minimum standards that offer gains 
exceeding their costs. 
239. California subjects out-of-state corporations to key provisions of its own corporation 
law if the average of the California fractions of its property, payroll, and sales is over 50%, and if 
more than one half of its outstanding voting securities are held of record by persons with Califor-
nia addresses. CAL. CoRP. CooE § 2115 (West 1990). New York does likewise when half of the 
corporation's business income is derived from within the state, and the corporation's shares are 
not listed on a national stock exchange. N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW§ 1320 (McKinney 1986). 
240. See supra text accompanying notes 202-08; Abeltshauser, supra note 24, at 1255-57. 
241. See Note, Federalism and Company Law: A "Race to the Bottom" in the European 
Community, 19 GEO. LJ. 1581, 1597-99 (1991); Reindl, supra note 19, at 1287. 
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B. An Institutionalist's Lessons 
An American institutionalist may be encouraged by the fact that 
European leaders have opted for coordination, but dismayed by the 
obstacles that have arisen even among policymakers who are commit-
ted in principle to coordination of safeguards. 
1. Co"oboration 
To an American institutionalist, whose views have been denigrated 
by market economists on one hand and by neofederalists on the other, 
the decision of European leaders to reject in principle the "race of 
laxity" brings welcome corroboration even though the progress of co-
ordination is disappointing. Europeans differ on the content of mini-
mum standards, but none of them seem to favor a free market in 
corporation law. The decision of Communitarians to establish mini-
mum standards in corporation law gains significance from the fact that 
they could have spared themselves stress and strain by letting each 
state choose its own regime. 
The European choice of coordination not only reinforces the view 
that corporations in a market economy need some marketwide stan-
dards, but also confirms many of the prevailing views of institutional-
ists on particular features of corporate law. For example, Europeans 
seem to agree that all common shares should carry voting rights,242 
governing boards should have at least a majority of nonexecutive 
members, 243 and creditors should have a right to block reorganizations 
that impair the security of their claims.244 
2. Would It Work Here? 
In considering what the European experience shows about the 
practicability of attaining minimum standards in the United States, 
institutionalists may start from the objectives set forth by William L. 
Cary in his seminal article on "Federalism and Corporate Law."245 
Substantively, he argued for standards of fiduciary duty and offairness 
in conflict-of-interest situations; for more shareholder participation in 
bylaws, meeting agendas, and major decisions; for abolition of nonvot-
ing common shares; for restrictions on indemnification of directors, 
and for easier suability of officers and directors. 246 
242. Fifth Directive 1983, supra note 13, art. 33. 
243. Id. arts. 6, 21A(l). 
244. See Third Directive, supra note 12, arts. 13, 14. 
245. Cary, supra note S. 
246. Id. at 702. 
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Above all, Cary wanted to abolish the race of laxity,247 whereby 
the "public choice"248 of corporation laws is made by people who bear 
very few of the consequences of the rules they choose. Under these 
circumstances, the diverse interests of the populations affected by cor-
porate behavior have no chance to participate in the public choice of 
alternative regulations. When the coordination program is analyzed 
in terms of these objectives, it falls far short of providing a model for 
American institutionalists. 
a. An end to the race of laxity? The Community coordination 
program does not exhibit a reliable means of halting the race of laxity. 
Diverse demands of the Communities' member states led to the direc-
tive's offering a variety of governance structures that some states could 
use to attract corporations from others. Demands of American states 
might lead to a similar diversity of offerings. Although the Communi-
ties' "real registered office" test makes the choice of corporate law a 
little less free than it is in the United States, it permits corporate 
havens to allure foreign enterprises at a very moderate degree of 
inconvenience. 
b. Standards of fiduciary duty and of faimess. A major concern 
of U.S. institutionalists has been the laxity of the standards of fiduciary 
duty and of fairness in conflict-of-interest transactions applied by some 
state courts. Delaware decisions have been compared unfavorably 
with decisions of federal courts.249 Whether the Community direc-
tives, effective or proposed, preclude the emergence of a similar prob-
lem in the Communities is unclear. 
The main basis for enforcing fiduciary duties that has appeared to 
date is a principle enunciated by the proposed fifth directive, which 
enjoins the managers and supervisors to act "in the interest of the 
company, having regard to the interest of the shareholders and em-
ployees."250 This principle would be embodied in the laws of particu-
lar states, which would be interpreted in the first instance by courts of 
the state. It might be applied more indulgently in some states than in 
others, just as similar provisions on directors' and officers' duties are 
247. Id. at 705. 
248. On the theory of public choice, see Tollison, Public Choice of Legislation. 74 VA. L. 
REv. 339 (1988); cf. Folk, Some Reflections of a Corporate Law Draftsman. 42 CoNN. B. 1. 409 
(1968); Comment, Law fer Sale: A Study of the Delaware Corporation Law, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 
861 (1969). 
249. See Cary, supra note 5, at 670-96. 
250. Fifth Directive 1983, supra note 13, arts. 10a(2), 2lq(2). 
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differently interpreted in the United States.251 
The question whether a particular action of management serves the 
interests of a corporation proved debatable in U.S. takeover battles 
even when the shareholders were the only constituency to be consid-
ered. It seems likely to be doubly difficult in Europe, where an action 
that disserves shareholders could be justified as serving employees, and 
vice versa. The decision would usually be complicated by economic 
and social conditions that are peculiar to each country. Under these 
circumstances, the European Court of Justice would be faced with a 
formidable task if it undertook to substitute its opinion on the correct-
ness of a disputed corporate action for that of the court of a member 
state. Thus, the Community program does not seem to offer a reliable 
formula for establishing uniform standards of fiduciary duty. 
c. The powers of shareholders. In the area of shareholder rights, 
Cary called for shareholder participation in bylaws and meeting agen-
das, more shareholder participation in major decisions, and abolition 
of nonvoting shares.252 
Pending adoption of the fifth directive, the coordination program 
will do little for the powers of shareholders that is not done by most 
American corporation laws. But under the proposed fifth directive, 
shareholders would be granted some legislative protection that they do 
not enjoy in the United States. All common shares would have voting 
rights "proportionate to the fraction of capital subscribed which the 
share represents."253 This requirement bars the door against the issu-
ance of nonvoting common shares and of shares with radically differ-
ent voting rights that awakened the protests of various American 
commentators. 254 
The fifth directive also contains requirements for notifying share-
251. The possibility of the European Court's imposing a uniform interpretation on member 
state courts is suggested by the decision of the European Court of Justice on November 13, 1990, 
that it could overrule an interpretation of a member state's law that conflicted with a Community 
directive. Marleasing S. A. v. La Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion S.A., Common Mkt. 
Rep. (CCH) 1195,900 (1990). The case involved a relatively categorical question, rather than one 
involving a balancing of complex factors. 
252. Cary, supra note 5, at 702. 
253. Fifth Directive 1983, supra note 13, art. 33(1). There are two exceptions. The voting of 
preferred shares may be denied or restricted, id. art. 33(2)(a), and the number of votes cast by 
any single shareholder may be limited. Id. art. 33(2)(b). The latter restriction must apply 
equally to all shareholders of the same class. Id. 
254. See Seligman, Equal Protection in Shareholder Voting Rights: The One Common Share, 
One Vote Controversy, 54 GEO. WASH. L. R.Ev. 687 (1986). For a contrary view, see D. FIS-
CHEL, ORGANIZED EXCHANGES AND THE REGULATION OF DUAL Cl.Ass CoMMON STOCK 
(1986); Dent, Dual Class Capitalization: A Reply to Professor Seligman. 54 GEO. WASH. L. R.Ev. 
725 (1986). 
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holders of meetings and of their subject matter.255 These rules are 
more detailed than those found in American corporation codes, 2s6 
although less so than those in the federal proxy rules. 2s1 
The major effort of the directive in relation to shareholder rights is 
to provide the governing boards with nonexecutives, who would com-
prise all the members of the supervisory council in a two-tier system, 
or a majority of the administrative board in a one-tier regime.258 In 
this respect, the proposed directive goes beyond any American corpo-
ration code, and even beyond the recommendations of the ALI Princi-
ples of Governance, which recommend an independent majority,2s9 
but avoid dec~aring that the law should require it. 260 
But a majority of nonexecutive directors seems unlikely to do 
much for shareholders if the nonexecutives are handpicked by the ex-
ecutives. In the United States, where institutional shareholders, unlike 
the German banks,261 are predominantly passive, the executives are 
likely to control the proxy system and elect reliable allies to be their 
supervisors. If independent supervision is to be established in the 
United States, American institutional investors must be liberated and 
activated to exercise their voting power with the vigor of German 
banks.262 
d. For whose benefit? The Communities' experience casts new 
light on a current controversy in the U.S. corporation law: Should 
corporate directors serve not only shareholders, but also employees, 
suppliers, consumers, communities, and other corporate 
''constituencies''?263 
Legislative authorization to manage in the interests of multiple 
constituencies, which Americans greeted as a new invention in the 
1980s, was an old story in Europe. In 1937 the parliament of the 
Third Reich directed that corporate executives should "manage the 
255. Fifth Directive 1983, supra note 13, art. 24. 
256. See, e.g., MBCA, supra note 35, §§ 7.05 (meetings in general), 10.03(d) (amendments), 
11.03(d) (merger and share exchange). 
257. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (1990). 
258. See supra text accompanying notes 188-201. 
259. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 199, § 3A.01. 
260. Id. §§ 3.01-3.05. 
261. See supra text accompanying note 200. 
262. See R. MONKS & N. MINow, POWER AND ACCOUNTABILITY 181-238 (1991); Gilson, 
Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. R.Bv. 863, 
865 (1991); Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 
79 GEO. L.J. 445 (1991); Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. R.Bv. 520 
(1990); Conard, Beyond Manageria/ism: Investor Capitalism?, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REP. 117 (1988). 
263. See sources cited supra note 187. 
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corporation as the good of the enterprise and its retinue and the com-
mon weal of folk and ~ealm demand."264 What priorities should be 
assigned among these multifarious objectives was inevitably disputed 
among German scholars26S until the German parliament mercifully 
dropped the clause, and left the governors with a terse direction to 
"manage. "266 In the meantime the German parliament had granted 
seats on the Supervisory Council to employees without any accompa-
nying indication of whose interests they were bound to serve.267 
In 1980, the Conservative British parliament ordered that directors 
have regard to the interests of employees, 268 but gave employees no 
means, either by representation or by judicial proceedings, to enforce 
the command.269 
With these lessons of history before it, the Commission embedded 
in its proposed fifth directive at least two interesting conclusions about 
regarding constituency interests. First, managers can and should re-
gard the interests of employees concurrently with those of investors. 
Second, a command to regard the interests of employees is effective 
only if employees have a voice in governance. 
What importance Community leaders placed on protecting inter-
ests of constituencies other than shareholders and employees is un-
clear; no proposals for corporate governors to consider other interests 
have emerged from the Community organs. Communitarians may 
have thought that additional "regards" would lead to confusion or in-
action, or that there was no feasible means of providing representation 
of other constituencies, or simply that the question should be deferred 
to another day, consistent with the policy of coordinating by easy 
stages. 
264. AktG 1937, supra note 51, § 70(1). ''Retinue," "folk," and "realm" are translations of 
similarly old-fashioned German terms (Gefolgschaft Volk, and Reich), that were embraced by 
the National Socialists to recapture the aura of past grandeur. 
265. See Abeltshauser, supra note 24, at 1259-60; Grossmann, supra note 209, at 153. 
266. Ger. SCL, supra note 51, § 76(1). 
267. See supra note 202. Although§ 70 of AktG 1937, supra note 51, remained in force until 
1965, it applied only to the managing board; employee representatives were elected to the supervi-
sory council 
268. See supra note 210 and accompanying text. 
269. The "regard" clause was followed by one that declared that -
the duty imposed .•• above on the directors of a company is owed by them to the company 
(and the company alone) and is enforceable in the same way as any other fiduciary duty 
owed to a company by its directors. 
Companies Act 1980 § 46(2). This means that suit could be brought only by the company itself, 
or by a shareholder suing derivatively on behalf of the company. It could not be maintained by 
or on behalf of an employee. 
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VII. SUMMARY 
In a competitive market for goods and services, the European 
Communities rejected a competitive market for corporation law. They 
adopted instead a program that might be called, in American terms, 
"federal minimum standards." It leaves to the member states the 
registration of corporations and the framing of corporation laws, sub-
ject to Community directives on features of the greatest economic im-
port. It also leaves to state courts, at least in the first instance, the 
application of corporation laws. 
The most striking features of the Communities' minimum stan-
dards were still, in 1991, under negotiation. These were the require-
ment that corporations give to nonexecutives the ultimate control of 
corporations, and that employee representatives participate, or at least 
be consulted and heard, in the making of major decisions. But some 
features that differ radically from those of current U.S. corporation 
law are firmly in place; a notable example is the requirement of creat-
ing and maintaining a stated level of capital. 
Whether the Community program can prevent a "race of laxity" 
remains to be seen. In order to reach agreement on nonexecutive con-
trol and on employee representation, the Community has had to toler-
ate a wide variety of options, which some states might use to lure 
enterprises away from others. If the race is foreclosed, economists will 
question whether minimum standards have inhibited or promoted effi-
cient allocation of resources. In any event, the Community program 
of coordination will provide Americans with an opportunity to ob-
serve a new and different relationship between uniformity and diver-
sity of corporation laws in a federal system. 
